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A SURVEY OF STATUTORY CHANGES IN
NORTH CAROLINA IN 1943
This article is designed to bring forward for discussion a few of
the statutes passed by the General Assembly in 1943. The article has
been prepared largely by the faculty of the Law School of the University of North Carolina.
The abbreviation "C.", as used in the text, indicates a chapter of
the 1943 Session Laws of North Carolina. The abbreviation "C. S."
indicates the Consolidated Statutes (though, for convenience, the usual
reference given is to the appropriate sections of Michie's Code of
1939).
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
C. S. 3294 authorizes certain persons to take acknowledgments of
instruments permitted or required by law to be registered. In order
to facilitate the execution of instruments by persons serving in the
armed forces of the government, C. 159 re-writes this section to include
in the list of those authorized to take acknowledgments, the following
persons: a Captain or officer of higher rank in the U. S. Army or
Marine Corps; any officer of the Navy, Coast Guard, or Merchant
Marine of the rank of Senior Grade Lieutenant or higher. Such official
is not required to use any seal but must sign his name, designate his
rank, give the name of his ship or organization and the date. The
statute indicates the form of the certificate of acknowledgment to be
used. From this form it appears that the amended portion of the
statute applies only to the acknowledgments of persons serving in the
armed forces of the United States. The statute also validates instruments the acknowledgments of which have been taken by such officials
designated in the statute prior to its enactment.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Administrative QuarantineRegulations
Included in C. 640 are provisions for quarantine by the state veterinarian or his representative in accordance with regulations promulgated
by the state board of agriculture of all livestock infected with or exposed
to a contagious or infectious disease. All livestock inoculated with a
living virus or organism must be quarantined by the person doing the
inoculating in accordance with regulations by the state board. The
provisions appear to be plainly valid; indeed the power to quarantine
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diseased stock already existed under our statutes.' But the act also
specifies that all livestock transported or otherwise brought into the
state shall be in compliance with regulations promulgated by the state
board of agriculture. The validity of this latter provision might be
questioned on the ground that the state board is empowered to make
regulations of any sort with no standard for its guidance, 2 but an
implied standard may be found in the purpose of the act, which is to
control livestock diseases, and it could be held that the regulations are
by implication to be such as have a bearing on that objective.D*
Court Injunction on Application of Administrative Agency
The ache and liniment method of legislating is illustrated by C. 444,
which gives to the N. C. State Board of Optometry authority to apply
to the superior court for a temporary or permanent restraining order
or injunction to restrain violations of the statute regulating the practice
of optometry. Some enlightenment as to the reasons for the enactment of this provision is to be had from the case of Ritholz v. North
Carolina State Board of Examiners in Optometry.' Before that suit
was brought an injunction had been obtained by the board of optometry
in the superior court of Mecklenburg County prohibiting the operation of plaintiff's business in violation of provisions of the statute
regulating optometry. Then the present action was brought in the
federal court to obtain an injunction to prevent the enforcement of
the state superior court injunction. The federal court dismissed the
action for want of jurisdiction. In the opinion of the federal court
the findings of fact by the state superior court are set out, showing the
practices of the defendant Jn the state court case, plaintiff in this, including advertising by newspaper and radio that glasses were to be had
complete for $3.45, although they usually turned out to cost several
times that in the end; examinations at the local place of business in
Charlotte whereupon the glasses were sent from Chicago; the hiring
of a physician to be in charge of the eye tests who had little experience
in such work; and the furnishing of glasses which were in some cases
downright ifijurious to the eyes of the customer.
Certainly the prevention of practices such as the above is an objec"N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §4688, par. 3; State v. Southern Ry., 141
N. C. 846, 54 S. E. 294 (1906); State v. Garner, 158 N. C. 630, 74 S. E. 458
(1912).
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. (2d) 854 (1940); note (1933) 12
N. C L. REv. 44.
Z*Cf. State ex. rel. Wis. Inspection Bureau v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220
N. W. 929 (1928); note (1933) 12 N. C. L. REv..44. In a comparable existing
statute the power to regulate the transportation of stock in the state is part of
the same sentence which empowers quarantine. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§4688.
118 F. Supp. 409 (M.D.N.C. 1937).
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tive with which no public spirited citizen is likely to quarrel. But the
fashion in which the legislature dealt with this matter justifies some
comments. In the first place, as above intimated, this is legislation by
the ache and liniment method. A particular trouble arises; a bit of
legislation is concocted for the particular trouble. Here a case arose
where a particular board had sought injunction against particular ills;
the legislature made plain the right of this particular board to obtain an
injunction akainst illegal practices in its particular field. But if it be
desirable for this board to have this power, why should the legislature
not have taken up the question whether it would be equally desirable
for the multitude of other administrative boards and agencies of the
state to have the same power? For example, it is possible for a dental
concern to set up a method of selling plates along the same lines that
the offenders in the Ritholz case followed in selling glasses. Why
should not the board of dental examiners have the same right to seek
an injunction against illegal practices? Or the board of medical
examiners? Or any and all of the numerous other administrative
boards? Apparently only a few scattered instances exist in which any
of the administrative boards and agencies of the state have by statute
been authorized to bring suit in court to enjoin illegal practices.2 *
The haphazard growth of administrative agencies with endless and
needless diversities in their powers has been the subject of more extensive comment in this Review. 3 Perhaps the establishment by C. 382,
commented on in this article under the title, "Legislation," of a system
of continuous statute research and correction may be a first step4*
in the direction of establishing an agency charged with the duty of
presenting to the legislature statutes carefully worked out, comprehensive, and systematic, thus bringing some order out of the chaos of piecemeal legislation.
In the second place, it is noteworthy that the procedure here made
available to the board of optometry is off the beaten path of the usual
2
*N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2613(aa) provides that the utilities
commission shall have the right to enforce by injunction the provisions of the
article (bus law) or rules and regulations made thereunder; §4768(4) authorizes
the commissioner of agriculture to obtain an injunction in the superior court restraining violation of §4768(3) concerning pure food, drugs, and cosmetics;
§4930(16) authorizes the tobacco commission to obtain an injunction to restrain
violation of the statute regulating production, sale, etc., of tobacco or of regulations issued pursuant thereto. The legislature this year by C. 724, §1 gave the
commissioner of agriculture similar power to obtain injunctions against violations of the livestock market act or rules and regulations thereunder.
'Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licendng Statutes
(1938) 17 N. C. L. Rxv. 1; Hoyt, Salping Judicial Revdew of Adminivtrativa
Tribunals (1937) 16 N. C. L. REV. 1.
'* Certainly C. 382 is no more than a first step since the objective is to eliminate ambiguities, conflicts, duplications, and other imperfections of form and
expression rather than of substance.
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powers of administrative agencies.5* An orthodox method for preventing illegal practices by enterprises under the regulation of important
administrative agencies is to give the agency power to order the practices discontinued. If an administrative order is not obeyed, statutes
commonly provide a court action to enforce it. 6 Court action to enforce
administrative orders may take the form of an injunction compelling
obedience or restraining disobedience.7* The device in C. 444 of simply
giving the administrative board standing as a party litigant to seek an
injunction in court does not on its face seem as effective as giving the
administrative board power to issue its own order in the first instance,
to be enforced, if not obeyed, by court action. But perhaps the legislature deems it unwise public policy to give the more effective power to
the relatively insignificant administrative agencies regulating occupations, and on the contrary deems it wiser to leave such agencies to seek
initial action by the courts. But whichever procedure is deemed sound
policy, there seems little reason for conferring the power hit or miss
on one agency at a time.
Apart from the question of the a'drh inistrative board as the party
seeking the injunction is the question of validity of statutory authority
to use the injunction to prevent violations of regulatory statutes. Almost
a half century ago a federal court exercised such statutory authoritys*
Rules and Regulations-Fling
In 1934 the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the
American Bar Association said,
"A few words should, however, be devoted to the imperative necessity for making the rules, regulations and other exercises of legislative
power by federal administrative agencies available at some central office
and (with oppropriate provision for emergency cases) to subject them
to reasonable requirements by way of registration and publication as
prerequisite to their going into force and effect.
"The public generally, and most lawyers, do not realize how great
is the flood of administrative legislation which is daily poured forth
by federal agencies; particularly since March 4, 1933. . . . Practically
S*Cf. note 2, supra. A more familiar use of the injunction in the field of
administrative law is to restrain improper administrative action. 2 Vom
FEDERAL ADMINIsTRATIVE LAW

BAUR,

(1942) §§626, 632, 704; Stason, Methods of Ju-

dicial Relief from Administrative Action (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 274.
02 Vom BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINImSRAivE LAW (1942) §§617, 621.
7* Enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission may be
had by injunction compelling obedience or restraining disobedience. 24 STAT.
385 (1887), 34 STAT. 591 .(1906), 49 U .S. C. A. §16 par. 12 (1929) and Supp. 1942.
8*26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. §4 (1941) provides for suits by U. S.
district attorneys to restrain violations of a federal statute to protect trade and
commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies. In United States v. Elliott,
62 Fed. 801 (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1894) the court exercised the statutory power by
issuing such an injunction.
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every agency to which legislative power has been delegated (or subdelgated) has exercised it, and has published its enactments, sometimes
in the form of official printed pamphlets, bound or looseleaf, sometimes
in mimeograph form, sometimes in privately owned publications, and
sometimes in press releases. Sometimes they exist only in sort of an
unwritten law.
"Under these circumstances not only citizens but even lawyers are
helpless in any effort to ascertain the law applicable-to a given state
of facts."'
The situation above described soon thereafter led to the remedies
which the committee thus advocated. Congress passed the Federal
Register Act.2 Its two principal provisions were first, that documents,
including among others executive orders of general applicability and
legal effect and rules, regulations, and orders of federal agencies, determined by the President to have general applicability and legal effect,
were to be filed with a division of the National Archives Establishment,'
where they were to be available for public inspection. Until so filed
they were not valid against any person having no actual knowledge of
them. Under the act as- amended3 each agency of the government on
July 1, 1938, and every fifth year thereafter, is also to file a complete
codification of all documents which, in the opinion of the agency, have
general applicability and legal effect, and are still in operation. The
second principal provision of the act called for the publication of these
documents in a serial publication designated the "Federal Register."
Publication of the Federal Register ensued and still continues.
Comparable to the output .of rules and regulations by federal administrative agencies described in the language above quoted is the
mass of such rules and regulations turned out by state agencies. Of
course the volume is not so staggering, but in view of the large number
of the state agencies, 4* the volume is still formidable. Further, as was
true in the case of the federal agencies at the time the committee wrote,
the state agencies have turned out rules and regulations over a considerable number of years, and they are to be found scattered in a variety
of places if they are to be found at all.5* In 1937 a state staute comparable to the Federal Register Act was advocated in the Review.6
59 A. B. A. REP. (1934) 552-555.
STAT. 500 (1935), 44 U. S. C. A. §§301-314 (Supp. 1942).
'50 STAT. 304 (1937), 53 STAT. 1435 (1939), 44 U. S. C. A. §311 (Supp. 1942).
'*Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation under Licensing Statutes
(1938) 17 N. C. L. REv. 1 list almost fifty occupations subject to licensing in this
state. Control of occupations is only one field of activity where administrative
agencies exist.
'* The writer is informed that some of the rules and regulations were written
nowhere except in the minutes of the meetings of the administrative body enacting them.
'A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinain 1937 (1937) 15 N. C.
L. REv. 321, 325.
1

249
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Generally speaking C. 754 takes the first step taken in the Federal
Register Act but not the second. Filing of administrative rules and
regulations in one place is provided for, but not printing of them all in
one publication. In substance C. 754 requires each agency of the state
created by statute and authorized to exercise regulatory, administrative
or semi-judicial functions, to file with the Secretary of State a complete copy of all existing general administrative rules and regulations or
rules of practice and procedure formulated or adopted by the agency
for the performance of its functions or for the exercise of its authority.
Amendments and new rules and regulations adopted thereafter are to
be so filed immediately. Rate, service, or tariff schedules or orders,
and rules and regulations referring thereto are excepted.7* Existing
rules and regulations are to reinain in force until June 1, 1943, but
are to be in force therafter only from the time of filing.
As stated above no provision is made for any publication comparable to the Federal Register, but perhaps the same end is accomplished for some purposes by the provision, "The said rules and regulations shall be available to any member of the public, but the Secretary
of State shall have the authority to charge the usual and customary
fee for certified copies thereof." 8* This language plainly indicates that
members of the public are to be furnished copies of the rules and regulations. Practical administration of this provision probably will require
that the Secretary of State have the rules and regulations of each agency
printed separately, to be furnished on request at the prescribed fees. At
any rate the public, and the lawyers, will be able to obtain from one
source such administrative rules and regulations of such agencies as may
be important to them. It is hard to overemphasize the value of this
statute in making readily available at one place all the voluminous law
turned out in the form of rules and regulations of state administrative
agencies. Technically such rules and regulations may not be "law,"' *
7* Perhaps because such rate schedules are already required to be filed with
the appropriate regulatory agency, and the persons concerned are in the practice
of finding them there, together with administrative rules and orders affecting
them. Thus under N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1112(4) public utilities file

their schedules with the utilities commission, where they are open to public inspection. By §1074 as amended carrier rates are to be filed when required with

the utilities commission and published by it. If C. 754 had included such schedules
and applicable orders it might have resulted in unnecessary duplication.
*N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §3864 prescribes that in cases not otherwise provided for the secretary of state shall receive for copies of records from
his office one dollar for the first three copy-sheets (by §3851 a copy-sheet is 100
words) and ten cents a copy-sheet thereafter.

'*The supreme court of the state sometimes thinks such rules and regulations
are not "law." Motsinger v. Perryman, 218 N. C. 15, 9 S. E. (2d) 511 (1940),

where the court held that a regulation of the industrial commission was not law.

But in State v. Dudley, 182 N. C. 822, 109 S.E.63 (1921) it appears in the
opinion of the court that a statute provided that violators of "this article," or

"this section" were guilty of a misdemeanor, and the court sustained a conviction
of violation of orders of a board made pursuant to the article. If such orders are
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but the violation of some of them may land the citizen in jail as tightly
as if they were "law,"1 ° * and it is common knowledge that the daily
affairs of the people are increasingly subject to them.
Stop Sale Orders
In contrast with C. 444, giving the board of optometry power to
seek court injunctions restraining violations is C. 483 which gives the
board of agriculture, commissioner of agriculture, and their agents,
authority to issue "stop sale" orders prohibiting sale of agricultural
products in violation of the state statute on marketing, grading, and
branding of such products. The "stop order" is a familiar procedural
device for administrative agencies,"* but notably absent from C. 483
is any provision for notice, hearing and procedure designed to insure
due process.2 *
Trial Examiners
A familiar procedural device for administrative tribunals was made
available to the newly created North Carolina Utilities Commission-in
1941. The commission was authorized to make rules of practice for
hearings before a single commissioner or employee of the commission,
the rules to provide for a proposed report, exceptions thereto, and a
final hearing before the full commission.' C. 782 eliminates the provision for hearings before an employee of the commission, but leaves
the provision for hearings before one or more members of the commission. Thus a commissioner, but not an employee of the commission, may act as trial examiner. From a purely practical point of view
the result is sound if the commissioners are able to handle all the trial
work themselves, especially in view of the difficulty likely to be met
in securing examiners of sufficient ability, in endowing their office with
sufficient prestige, and in giving their decisions enough weight, to make
part of a particular law, namely "this article," it is bard to understand why they
are not law. But the case may be explained on the ground that the statute as
recited by the court made the regulations of equal force with the provisions of
the act. Not so easy to explain is State v. Southern Ry., 141 N. C. 846, 855, 856,
54 S. E. 294, 297, 298 (1906) wherein the court approved the doctrine that departmental rules and regulations established pursuant to statute "have the force
of law" and are entitled to judicial notice; also the public must take notice of
them at its peril.
"0*The process is to provide by statute that violation of the administrative
regulations shall be a criminal offense. State v. Hodges, 180 N. C. 751, 105 S. E.
417 (1920); State v. Southern Ry., 141 N. C. 846, 54 S. E. 294 (1906); note
(1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 50.
1*38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §45 (1941), authorizing the Federal
Trade Commission to issue cease and desist orders; 48 STAT. 79 (1933), 15 U. S.
C. A. §77 h (d) (1941), authorizing the Securities and Exchange Commission
to issue stop orders suspending registration statements.
'*Notes (1934) 34 CoL L. REv. 332, (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 96. The
federal
statutes cited in note 1, supra, provide notice and hearing.
1
N. C. Pub. L. 1941, c. 97, §6. This provision is commented on in A Survey
of Statutory Changes it; North Carolinain 1941 (1941) 19 N. C. L. Rv. 435, 442.
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them effective trial officers rather than mere officers before whom the
2
evidence is recorded in writing. *
CARRIERS-SPECIAL POLICE
C. 676 amends C. S. 3484 to permit the Governor to appoint special
police for any "motor vehicle carrier" as in the past has been allowable
for "any corporation operating a railroad on which steam or electricity
is used as the motive power or any electric or water power company
or constuction company or manufacturing company." C. S. 3485 is
amended to provide that commissions for all such special police be filed
with the Utilities Commission, instead of the old Corporation Commission, and to drop the requirement that a certificate of each appointment be filed with the clerk of each county through or into which the
railroad runs or in which the company is engaged in work and in which
it is intended the special police shall act. The act also amends C. S.
3488 relative to the termination of the special policeman's authority.
Whenever the services of such policeman are no longer 'equired, the
company "may" file a notice to that effect in the office of the Governor
and in the office of the Utilities Commission. Formerly, the notices of
termination were to be filed in the several clerks' offices where the notice
of appointment had been filed.
The act also corrects a defect in the last sentence of C. S. 3484
by striking out the word "railroad" shown here in italics: "Nothing
contained in the provisions of this section shall have the effect to relieve
any such railroadcompany from any civil liability now existing by statute or under the common law for the act or acts of such policemen, in
exercising or attempting to exercise the powers conferred by this
section." Before the deletion of the word "railroad," an inference might
have been drawn that the other companies mentioned in the section
were relieved of liability.
Since C. S. 3484 permits only those railroads "on which steam or
electricity is used as the motive power" to apply for the appointment
of special police, further revision might become necessary if the use
of diesel engines should become more general.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
C. 57 proposes to amend Article III of the state constitution by adding the three Commissioners of Agriculture, Labor and Insurance to
2*FINAL REP. ATr'y GENERAL'S Co miTTEE ON ADmiN. PROC. (1941) 46-55,
contains recommendations for improving the functioning of hearing or trial officers of the federal administrative agencies. The report points out, p. 53, that the

recommendations are not needed where members of the agency themselves act as
trial officers. The extent of the use of trial officers by the federal agencies, the
functions of these trial examiners, data concerning their qualifications, salaries,
etc. may be found in Appendix H of the report.
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the list of constitutional state officers, along with the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Auditor, Treasurer, Superintendent
of Public Instruction and Attorney General. This increases to ten
the number of elective state officers, who in turn constitute the Council
of State.
Modern developments in state government are not in accord with
the contemplated change, but instead the tendency is toward the "short
ballot." The most effective organization of the executive department
would vest in the Governor the power to select the heads of the various
departments, who constitute the members of his cabinet. Thus the
chief executive could be held responsible for the proper conduct of the
state government.l* The effect of the present proposal, whereby ten
executive officers are elected by the people, is to further divide responsibility and thus create an opportunity for governmental inefficiency.
The Virginia constitutional revision of 1928 is worthy of study in this
connection.2 Since 1928, the only elective state officers in Virginia are
the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Attorney General. All others
are appointed by the Governor and responsible to him, except the
Auditor of Public Accounts, who is elected by the General Assembly.
This revision followed the report of the Prentis Committee appointed
by Governor Byrd in 1926, which, among other things, was concerned
with setting up an effective state government with full executive responsibility in the Governor.
C. 432 proposes to amend Article 14, section 7, by adding "notaries
public" to the list of officers who are exempt from the prohibition of
double office holding. This change was proposed in 1932 in the Report
of the Constitutional Commission,3 and represents dissatisfaction with
the decision in Harris v. Watson,4 that a notary public is a public
officer to whom the prohibition as to double office holding applies.
C. 468 proposes to amend Article IX, section 8, dealing with the
administration of the state school system by the board of education.
The new board is to be composed of the Lieutenant Governor, the
State Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public Instruction and ten
members to be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation
by the General Assembly in joint session. The General Assembly is
"*In a recent issue of Time, Gov. Thomas E. Dewey of New York is quoted
as follows: "It is a fundamental of government that the chief executive can't
run the whole show, and only to a limited extent can run the cabinet. But a great
deal depends on the cabinet heads and the men they select.... It's the old story
of getting the best men you can-and giving them full responsibility and more
work than they can dQ." Time, November 1, 1943, p. 16.
' Morrissett, Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of Virginia (1927)
13 VA. L. REG. (N.S.) 321.

Report of the North Carolina Constitutional Commission (1932) 11 N.
REv. 5, 37.
' 201 N. C. 661, 161 S. E. 215 (1932).

C. L.
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to divide the state into eight educational districts and one member is to
be appointed from each district and two members appointed at large.
The term of office is to be for eight years, but the first appointments are
staggered from two to eight years. "The State Sperintendent of Public Instruction shall be the administrative head of the public school
system and secretary of th6 Board," which is vested with "the general
supervision and administration of the free public school system and
of the educational funds provided for the support thereof."
This amendment is the result of a compromise agreed to at the
time of the election in 1942, when the amendments to Article IX, proposed by the 1941 General Assembly, were ratified. The 1941 amendments, 5 discussed in the North Carolina Law Review,0 were subject
to much public criticism, and the present proposal seeks to correct the
objectionable features of the 1941 amendments.
Like the proposed amendment increasing the number of constitutional officers, the present proposal provides for too large a board of
education, and, by having a member from each of eight educational
districts, local politics may affect the board's actions. The constitutional
commission in 1932 proposed a much simpler and more effective organization, 7 which is in accord with the tendency in state government
8
toward 'smaller and more efficient administrative bodies.
C. 497 proposes to amend Article III, section 11, to authorize the
General Assembly-to fix the compensation of the Lieutenant Governor,
which at present is the same as the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The duties of the Lieutenant Governor between terms of the
General Assembly have been increasing, and it is proper that he should
be paid on a separate basis for his services.
C. 662 proposes to amend Article X, section 8, by abolishing the constitutional requirement of private examination of a wife for the sale
of a homestead. Under the present section, a deed executed by a homesteader without the voluntary joinder of his wife, signified by her
private examination, is invalid and passes no title to the homestead.9
It is a void transaction. The proposal will eliminate this requirement
of private examination of the wife, but the deed to a homestead must
still be signed and acknowledged by the wife in order to be a valid
conveyance, even as to the husband's interest.
If the amendment is adopted, what will be its effect upon the statutory requirement of private examination of married women as to "every
conveyance, power of attorney or other instrument affecting the estate,
'N. C. I:ub. L. 1941, c. 151.

'A-Survey of Statutory Changes inNorth Carolina in 1941 (1941) 19 N. C.
L. REv. 435, 463.
'Supra note 3, at 32-33.
'VA.
Co Ts. Art. IX, §130.
9
Wittkowsky v. Gidney, 124 N. C. 437, 32 S. E. 731 (1899).
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right or title of any married woman in lands . . ."?10 Under this
statute, a married woman's deed without private examination is powerless to convey her interest, but the deed is valid to the extent of conveying the husband's interest. The amendment would change this rule
where a homestead is involved, thus creating an inconsistency with the
statute. Perhaps the purpose of the amendment is to enable the General Assembly to abolish the requirement of a separate and private
examination of married. women as to all their deeds and conveyances
of land.
CONVICTS
C. 452 authorizes the State Highway and Public Works Commission
to furnish prison labor for farm work upon a declaration of the existence
of an extraordinary emergency by the Governor, and when 'prisoners
are not needed for highway work. County farm agents are to act as
intermediaries between the farm owners and the prison department,
and the commission is to establish a price for the work to be sufficient
to cover custodial care of the prisoners, including pay for guards and
foremen, transportation and other expenses. Prisoners may be recalled
from the farms in the event an emergency with respect to highway
work arises.
Less of an emergency measure but somewhat akin to C. 452 is
C. 605 which amends C. S. 7758 to authorize the Board of Agriculture
of the state to contract in writing with the State Highway and Public
Works Commission for prison labor for the state test farms and
experimental stations.
CORPORATIONS
Merger
As long ago as 1930 the scholarly inclined Mr. Justice Adams concluded that our legislature had shown little comprehension of the technical distinction between consolidation and merger (i.e. between the
joining of two corporations to form a new corporation and the absorp'tion -of one by another which survived) and that what, in the corporation law, they had labelled merger was, when tested by the stipulated
results, really consolidation and nothing else., In consequence our
law knew no such legal metamorphosis as merger and when two coach
companies entered into what they described and intended as that kind
of transition there was no legal warrant for it and a consolidation
legally took place. 2* Since in either case the corporation which thence20 N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §997.
XN.C. Pub. L. 1925, c. 77.
2* Carolina Coach Co. v. Hartness, 198 N. C. 524, 152 S. E. 489 (1930).
This is one of the most fictional details in a fictional field. Whether the corporate
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forth conducted the business had all the rights of the two which formerly
did it, the only consequence which hurt was that $1,100 fees were
exacted for filing the certificate, whereas if one of the corporations had
been legally able to swallow the other as they intended and agreed, no
such fee would have been payable. Promptly the following year the
legislature undertook to remedy the shortcomings of the act, but instead of getting at the technical fault, that body showed it still knew
or cared nothing of what it was all about and simply limited the fees
in cases of "merger" 3 (merger being what the Supreme Court had just
said could not take place under the statute as it then read). Nevertheless that uncertain and contradictory state of the law (probably reflecting a friendly administrative attitude) seems to have satisfied the
bar, -despite occasional criticism of the language, 4 till 1943 when a lawyer
representative who understood the underlying trouble offered a bill rewriting the section so as to provide in precise language for both merger
and consolidation. 5* The revised section seems to bear more resemblance to the statutes of Michigan and California0 than to the uniform
corporation law or the statutes of other important commercial jurisdictions 7 but the key sentences making the improvement now referred to
seem to have been independently worked out. At the same time the
author extended the law in two other directions so as to permit (1) provision in the agreement for the distribution of property or securities
other than shares to stockholders of the constituent corporations in exchange for their shares,8* and (2) mergers with, and consolidations
into, foreign corporations where the foreign law is also favorable.9*
"personality" which emerges from the huddle is one of those that went in but
fattened up a bit or whether it is a new personality constructed from the dismembered personalities of those who went in is certainly not to be determined by
inspection. It depends on what you intend--.e., what you say, unless, as the court
here held, the law allows you no choice. Very practical matters hinge on the
legal distinction, however,-fees, corporate powers, priorities in "open end" corporate mortgages and in those with after acquired property clauses, etc.
'N. C. Pub. L. 1931, c. 209, proviso. See also 26 REP. A7rw'y GEN., N. C.
(1940) 57.

" Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinain 1939 (1939) 17 N. C. L.

REv. 327, 346.
* C. 270. Apparently the title continues to be "Merger" only, though it may
be changed in the new General Statutes of 1943. The stopgap fee limitation was
dropped in this revision. It seemed not to have been codified in Michie's Code.
615 MIcH. STAT. ANN. (1937) §21.52; CA. Civ. CoDE (Deering, 1941) §361.
"E.g., Del. Laws 1941, c. 132, §12; ILa. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1935) c.
32, §157.61; MD. ANN. CoDE (Flack, 1939) art. 23, §§33-37; 5 MAss. ANN. LAws
(Supp. 1942) c. 156, §§46A-46E; N. J. STAT. ANN. (Perm. Ed. 1939) tit. 14,
§14:12-1; N. Y. LAws (Thompson, 1939) c. 59, §85; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1938)
tit. 15, §2852-901-. Missouri seems to have no provision for either consolidation
or merger.
s*This provision is found in the California statute, supra note 6, with a limitation on the amount of securities that can be issued.
9*As urged in a short comment on the amendment of 1939 (N. C. Pub. L.
1939, c. 5) which went part way and permitted (so far as could be) the "merger"
of foreign corporations with those of North Carolina. A Survey of Statutory

Changes in North Carolinain 1939 (1939) 17 N. C. L. REV. 327, 346.
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If any criticism can be offered of the provisions of the amendment
it is on one narrow point, i.e., that a consolidation must result in a new
corporation "which may be a corporation of the State of incorporation
of any one of said constituent corporations."' 0 This seems to preclude a North Carolina and a South Carolina corporation consolidating
to form a Virginia corporation though the same transaction would be
authorizfed if the resulting consolidated corporation was one of South
Carolina. If there is a good reason for this it has escaped me.
The amendment could well have gone into another matter, dealt with
by Section 122411 but inadequately, i.e., the effect is cases of consolidation of after acquired property clauses already present in mortgages
of the consolidating units. The present provision is that liens are
limited to property covered at the time of the consolidation. Nevertheless questions of importance and complexity arise which could be put
at rest.' 2 One evident misprint occurred,-"consideration" for "consolidation" in line 3 of p. 259.
Merger of Building and Loan Associations
Less than one week after the passage of C. 270 introducing merger
for the first time into the merger article of the Corporation Law,"* the
legislature passed C. 450 which had been offered by different sponsors,
to provide for the merging of building and loan associations. The provisions are not so elaborate as those having to do with corporations
and there is no doubt that what is provided is merger in the technical
sense and that alone, i.e., no consolidation. A rather interesting, though
not tremendously important additional consequence seems to have been
brought about when the building and loan statute in its before-amendment form is examined. The present amendment seems to have brought
merger into the law and by indirection put consolidation out of it at
the same time. Section 51742 provides that provisions of the Corporation Law "not inconsistent with this subchapter . . ." shall be
applicable to building and loan associations. The Corporation Law
has always purported to authorize merger and consolidation (though
as above seen, until this year it effectually gave power only to consolidate)3* and it might fairly have been assumed that building and
" N. C. ConE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1224(a), as now amended in C. 270, §1,
p. 259.

'IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1224.

2 See Estabrook & Co. v, Consolidated Gas, Elec. Lt. & Pow. Co. of Baltimore, 122 Md. 643, 90 AtI. 523 (1914) ; note (1939) 26 VA. L. Rxv. 104; Klooster,
Mortages of After Acquired Railroad Property (1933) 27 ILu. L. REv. 781, and
citations.
I*N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1224(a)-(f), discussed -herein under the
heading Corporations, Merger.
Of N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939).
'* See heading in this article Corporations, Merger, note 2 and text.
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loan associations could consolidate under that statute, there being nothing on the subject in the building and loan lav.4* After the passage
of C. 270 this year they could either merge or consolidate under the
enlarged article of the Corporation Law. But, immediately afterward
building and loan associations were given axpress power to merge
(and merge only) under an amendment relating specifically and solely
to them. Considering that merger under the amendment can be brought
about only with the approval of and after a detailed examination by the
insurance commissioner and nothing less than that would likely be sanctioned for consolidation, the reasonable inference is that the consolidation and merger article of the Corporation Law no longer relates to
building and loan associations under Sec. 5174 and in consequence those
financial institutions no longer have the power to consolidate with each
other. The reason this effect of the new legislation is not of great
importance is that consolidation so closely approximates in legal effect
a sale of assets and dissolution that a statutory void on consolidation
is not likely to embarrass needful financial unions. A new corporation
can be organized and take over the business of established associations
without calling the deal consolidation or technically making it that. By
way of contrast the banking law provides for consolidations and "transfer of assets," the latter being kin to merger but not identical with it.5*
COURTS
Cancellation of Terms and Appointment of Extra Judges
Press reports of late May and early June stated that the Randolph
County bar were meeting in an effort to get the June 21 term of
criminal court for that county cancelled. Witnesses as well as defendants and other necessary people, said they, were in defense plants,
the Army, etc., etc., "the docket was too small to keep court more
than two days and farmers were busy with crops." Notwithstanding
these cogent reasons the lawyers were informed by the solicitor that the
bar had no authority in the premisesl* and the term must be held.2
'*The banking law expressly provided for mergers and consolidations of banks
with building and loan associations (and insurance companies) under the merger
article of the corporation law. N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §217(n). Approval by the respective commissioners is required.
1*N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §217 (k) (except as to unions with
building and loan associations, on which see note 4, supra.)
1* In this he was clearly right. The bar has seemingly never had any direct
say in the matter except for a brief periqd in Hyde County where "a written
agreement signed by each and every member" would operate to prune off an
additional civil term otherwise to be held in August, N. C. Pub. L. 1935, c. 191.
It may be assumed that unanimity of the bar could not be obtained even as to an
August term in a county on Pamlico Sound with ferry service to Ocracokel At
any rate the discretion was later transferred to the county commissioners. N. C.
Pub. L. 1941, c. 367, §1 (a). A special act !in 1943, C. 654, applicable to Union
County, somewhat ambiguously invites the recommendation of the local bar association
but gives it no necessary effect. See note 3 infra.
2
Greensboro News, 'June 4, 1943, p. 4, col. 4.
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Later reports are that it was held and lasted two days. (Nice predicting by the bar!) At the time of the discussion it appears that none
of the parties to it were aware of the newly enacted statute under which
the governor was given authority to cancel terms of superior court
for good cause,S* a fault perhaps of the press which failed to realize
the timeliness and immediate public importance of the law.
3*C. 348. The solicitor has since expressed the fear that if a term were thus
cancelled and some serious crime soon followed, there would be expense and
delay in bringing the accused to trial. The governor's power to order special
terms, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1450, may sufficiently meet this doubt.
See criticism of vesting the cancelling function in the governor expressed in the
views of Mr. Battle at the end of this footnote.
There have for several years been special provisions as to particular counties
for dispensing with some of the legislatively scheduled terms. There is no unifdrmity either in phraseology or operation-of these special provisions. The counties are listed below by districts and where no citation is given, the reference is
to N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1443.
First District-Hyde: "If in the opinion of the board of commissioners of
Hyde County it is not advisable or necessary to hold" an August additional term
and a majority so resolve a given time in advance "then said term shall not be
held" and the assigned judge shall be notified. N. C. Pub. L. 1941, c. 367, §1 (a).
Second District-Nash: Any term may be cancelled by the board of county
commissioners when in the opinion of the clerk of the superior court and the
resident judge "sufficient cause exists." C. 687.
Ninth District-Bladen: If the county commissioners find "that there is not
sufficient business" or that there "are no cases of sufficient importance to warrant the expense of a term," it and the cases shall be continued.
-Hoke:
The commissioners, on 30 days newspaper and posted
notice may "abrogate ... the holding of any one of the above set forth terms"
"whenever in their discretion the best interests of the county demand it."
-Robeson:
The commissioners with the written consent and approval of the district solicitor "may call off" any criminal term to which a judge
would have had to be assigned.
- Moore: Two civil terms totalling 3 weeks were "discontinued"
by C 629.
Thirteenth District-Union: (All terms 2 weeks, mixed). If the board coneludes that the docket does "not justify the holding of such term, or the second
week thereof" then they "in their discretion, and upon recommendation of the
Union County Bar Association may notify the clerk of the superior Court that
said term or the second week thereof, has been dispensed with" and the clerk
shall notify the judge and make no calendar. C. 654.
Sixteenth District-Catawba: By resolution 30 days in advance the board may
"determine that the holding of such court [apparently any term] is not necessary
and cancel the same," notice to follow to the governor.
Seventeenth Dictrict-Wilkes: If in the opinion of the board "it is not advisable or necessary to hold" a scheduled December two weeks mixed term, then on
timely resolution the judge shall be notified and it shall not be held. N. C. Pub.
L. 1941, c. 367 (j).
Eighteenth District-McDoweu: "In the event the county commiss'oners shall
find that any term for the trial of civil cases is not needed they may by resolution
sent to the Governor cancel the term in question." No time for action is stated.
C. 549.
Twentieth District-Jackson: "The county commissioners, may, in their judgment abrogate!' a mid-year criminal term requiring an assigned judge, jury drawing to await their decision for which no time is fixed. No notice is provided..
In commending the statute passed for his own county (Nash), Kemp D.
Battle, says in a letter, "A concurrence of opinion by the County Commissioners,
the Clerk of Superior Court and Resident Judge would assure adequate information and decision by those nearest to the problem and yet simplicity. I suppose
where the County Commissioners are given the authority they prevailingly con-

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

It seems an obviously warranted belief that Randolph County was
not unique in its court problems. Everybody knows that civil litigation, at least, has fallen to distressingly low levels! Distressingly low,
that is, if you are a practicing lawyer-if you are a judge, that's something different again and will be remarked upon later. But it is contrary to the genius of an otherwise free law review to proceed on the
basis of what everybody knows 4* and accordingly inquiries were sent

to clerks of the superior courts to learn what terms had been held, how
long they had lasted and what judges had presided. Most of the clerks
replied. The information they gave shows that some of the scheduled
terms were cancelled and that a large number of one-week terms lasted
but one or two days, while a considerable number of the scheduled twoweek terms were reported to have adjourned or expired after but one
to four days of activity.5*
What is more, these figures probably put too favorable a light on the
amount of. time actually consumed in holding court and transacting
judicial business. Some adjournments come early in the day, yet the
day of adjournment is shown as a full day of court. And in some
cases where the judge is not even present or any trial of cases conducted,
he may, under the provisions of C. S. 1448, create a paper record of the
court in session by having the sheriff adjourn court from day to day
throughout the scheduled term. Where the jury is held in readiness
this practice may represent at least a state of being ready, able and
(perhaps) willing to handle such business as may come up but if the
jury is dismissed, particularly in a criminal term, it could represent
little but stage effects. The court would have ceased to be occupied
suit the Clerk and perhaps the Resident Judge, but I think the three should agree

in the decision. Certainly it ought not to be a matter for the Governor. County
Commissioners alone may at times have their eyes glued too closely to the expense
account."
* Perhaps because what everybody knows to be so occasionally turns out not
to he so.
1*The following counties, listed in order of districts, did not report and no
figures for them are included in the totals: Hyde, Chatham, Craven, Pitt, Franklin, Alleghany, Moore, Mecklenburg, Mitchell, Polk, Caswell, Rockingham, Stokes.
Most terms during the last week of May and practically all June terms are not
included in these figures. Some terms early in the year were also not reported.
The summarized figures follow: ("E. & 0. E."). Of a larger total of one week
terms, 17 are reported to have been held but one day; 24, two days; and 41, three
days. Out of the two week terms, 4 are reported as lasting only one day; 6, two
days; 22, three days; 10, four days; 7, five days; 3 through the first week, and 3
for one or two days of the second week. Two weeks were reported held of one
three week term. Three two-week and four one-week terms were reported "cancelled" or "not held," these being in Anson, Stanley, Union, Forsyth, Catawba
and Wilkes counties, only Union, Catawba and Wilkes having specific legislative
authority to cancel. See note 3 mtpra. Notwithstanding possible errors, this is a
striking record, particularly in view of the missing counties and terms and the
fact that the June terms may be supposed to be lighter, if anything, than those
earlier in the year.
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and perhaps, under Detafield v. Levis Mercer Construction Company,'
would have ceased to exist when the judge left the bench despite Section 1448.
Whether the conditions disclosed be due to the Soldiers and Sailors
Civil Relief Act, to the fact that the "life of the party" in many communities is now in the Army or to these and other causes is for the
moment unimportant. In a day when greater human effort is demanded
of men, women and children, the courts are functioning in many of our
counties on a work-a-day, rest-four-or-five-days basis. From the standpoint solely of the efficient administration of our superior courts it
matters not whether the judges were to use the free time to play golf
or poker or to retire to a farm to reflect and mend fences. For some
cause they are not, during a substantial part of the time, doing what
primarily they were elected to do,--hold court. No one supposes, of
course, that a judge should hold court on all of the secular days of the
year. He must have time to consider the cases and the law in such
cases made and provided or which in such cases he will make and provide. 7 There are hearings in chambers to be reckoned with. And, of
course, one judge may get more really accomplished in one day than
another in two.8* But if court adjourns in one county on Monday
afternoon and there is a heavy docket in another, a business man, were
he in charge, 9* would pretty certainly see to it that the judge who had
sat for one day would not be left long standing but would soon be found,
8 115 N. C. 21, 20 S. E. 167 (1894). And see State v. McLeod, 222 N. C. 142,

22 S. E. (2d) 223 (1942); Edwards v. Perry, 208 N. C. 252, 179 S. E. 892
(1935) ; Dunn v. Taylor, 187 N. C. 385, 121 S. E. 659 (1924).
"See footnote 23 infra.
'*And per contra, the one who gets more done in the one day may sometimes
do it worse. Too speedy "justice" and too hasty judgment may be no justice and
poor judgment. Avoidable appeals certainly, represent no proud accomplishment
and no economy.
*.A prominent member of the bar of one county, how seriously and with what
maturity of thought I cannot say, has observed in a letter, "It has been said that
no judicial reform was ever brought about by lawyers. This being true, it occurs
to me that some efficient layman and business man should be appointed to look
into our entire court system and recommend the changes needed."
Another suggests a statute (or action by the governor if a statute is unnecessary)

".

. . by which there would be established a permanent salaried Board

with authority and duty to investigate and keep in touch with the dockets and
cancel and schedule terms of court according to the needs of the various counties.
Judges could be assigned by the Governor with the recommendations of the Board.
Under such a system, there would be a permanent record of the number of cases
disposed of, the number of cases remaining on the calendar, the number of continuances granted, in each case. The judges granting the continuances or whose
terms broke down and the local lawyers would be responsible to some one besides
themselves for the speedy trial of their cases. The board should bi made up of
lawyers and laymen. If a case is continued without cause for, say three times, it
would go to the foot of the docket."

See also address of Judge John J. Parker, The Improvement of Sudicial Administration in the State Courts (1941) 43 PRoc. N. C. BAR Ass'K. 72, 79; and
that of Robert Moseley, How Can The Bar Make Effective a Program of Law

Improvement (1943) 45 Id. 44, 49, quoting Raleigh News and Observer.
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another place to sit and that place would be in superior court of the
county with a crowded docket. Moreover, if the actual fact is that
there is no heavy docket in another county,1o* the same business man
hypothetically in charge of our judicial system would almost certainly
consider a reduction in staff.
Because no information was sent in on some of the counties and
also because of some errors and omissions in the reports received which
seemed not worth troubling the accommodating clerks to set right, it is
impossible to prepare from the reports received a reliable statistical
summary which would show exactly how much or little business has
been disposed of in our 1942-43 terms of superior court,"l* and which
judges have borne the brunt of the load, if it can now be called a load.
If, however, the bar association, whose reason to exist for the duration
has been questioned by some, were to study the problem quickly but
with care from Cherokee to Currituck 2* and take some energetic
action its membership would be well occupied. No such study could
be complete without leaning heavily-on the work already done by the
Committee on Judicial Administration and the Special Committee on
Improving the Administration of Justice of the American Bar Association:L* whose work owes so much to Judge John J. Parker. Nor
could it afford to neglect an intimate acquaintance with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts established in 1939 under the
4
direction of Mr. Henry P. Chandler.1
10* For the most part the information supplied indicates that the terms in the
more populous counties are not only more frequent but last a longer part of their
scheduled time, as would probably be expected. Wake County terms seem regularly to have consumed nearly a full week. But some terms are cut short even
in these counties and one term in Winston-Salem was reported cancelled, under
what authority was not stated. The Forsyth paragraph of N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §1443 scheduling terms of court makes no provision for cancellat.on as do paragraphs relating to some counties. See note 3 supra.
11* Detailed court statistics are furnished the attorney general under the requirement of N. C. Pub. L. 1939, c. 315 although the revelations of those statistics
seem never to have been made the basis for action.
12* Phrase used in deference to a resolution offered in 1943 General Assembly
which desired to smother the "upstart" substitute, "from Manteo to Murphy."
(June, 1943) PopuL~a GovERNLENT, 31.
Representative Moseley introduced a resolution in the 1943 legislature (H. B.
512) "providing for a Commission to Study the State Courts" with a view to
increasing their efficiency and simplifying and expediting the administration of
astice. It recited that "the General Assembly is of the opinion that the matter
is of sufficient importance to require the appointment of a commission for that
purpose." Evidently the Assembly was not. But this is no reason for the bar
not to act.
13* See on this and related, but much broader, problems, reports of these
Committees, (1938) 63 A. B. A. REP. 530, (1941) 66 Id. 289, 409, 456; Parker,
Improving the Administration of Justice (1941) 27 A. B. A. J. 71; Shafroth,
Improving Judicial Administration in the State Courts (1943) 8 Mo. L. Rxv. 5,
with bibliography.
1' See articles by the director, Administrative Office for Federal Courts (1940)
26 A. B. A. J. 723; The Place of the Administrative Offlce in the Federal Court
System (1942) 27 CoRN. L. Q. 364.
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Of course there is the Calendar Coimmission, but that body seems
to be timidly dormant. 15 And there is the commission on the "Feasibility of Increasing the number of Judicial Districts" originally appointed at a time of rising business and which was sent back to work
this year'0 but whose title hardly suggests a purpose or power to
initiate relief for the temporary waste of excess judicial facilities in
war time. And anyway its sole duty is to report to the 1945 legislature. The present situation may continue in part for longer than that
but the most obvious need is for s6mething to be done at once, the nontemporary maladjustments to be dealt with later.
The present comment constitutes no study but even the incomplete
information received, the comments of lawyers in widely separated counties, and a little .thought provoked by those comments point to a few
tentative observations pro and con, viz: (1) There is much waste in
putting court machinery in motion for a one or two day session (but
cancellation as permitted by C. 348, and by specific legislation for certain counties, delays and often thwarts justice 17* whose enforcement
the good people of our state already think proceeds at a snail's pace).
(2) In so far as it is due to breaking down of the calendar and not
to insufficient business, responsibility for the unsatisfactory situation
rests much on the bar whose members everlastingly seek continuances
for good cause and bad, often to relieve themselves of their own neglect. And in this evil some too accommodating judges have a share.
A city news story some years ago told of a taxi driver having been
shot and killed by a gangster fare whose order to speed away he did not
instantly follow. On the granting of the eighth continuance at the
request of defendant's counsel, the grief stricken and outraged father
of the victim drew a revolver and shot the gangster defendant to death
in the courtroom and within a few feet of the lenient judge.1s* If
"8N. C. Sess. L. 1943, Res. 21.
" Note (1941) 19 N. C. L. Rlv. 475.
17, One lawyer has questioned "the wisdom of cancelling any criminal term
even it lasts only two days, because, (a) if a defendant is arrested and unable to
give bond (due to present conditions people are even more reluctant than usual
to sign criminal appearance bonds), he stays in jail until court. If he is found
guilty he gets no credit on his sentence; if he is not guilty, he was held in jail
without cause; (b) the public interest requires speedy trials for criminals even
though the cost is high. If a case is not promptly tried witnesses get out of
reach and for this and other reasons, e.g., frailty of memory, the longer a case
is delayed the better a guilty man's chance of escaping conviction."
"*A local lawyer has reported with some indignation a case of his own in
which long 'continuances were granted for relatively non-urgent reasons till he
was no longer able to get his witnesses and the cause was lost. He describes the
general situation in his county at the time when he entered military service as
follows: "With the calendars most of the time from 18 to 24 months behind, the
scheduled terms were breaking down and being cancelled. Some of the breakdowns were 'unavoidable', but for the most part were a result of (1) inadequate
investigation of the calendar committee to determine the readiness for trial of
the cases calendared, (2) insistence by the judges that no cases be tried that
would not be completed by Friday noon, (3) granting of continuances without
cause of cases calendared for trial:'
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judges would insist on cases being tried except for good reason or
when settled, fewer calendars would break down on Monday or Tuesday.lO* (3) Consolidation of the terms of several rural counties at one
2°
place would effect economies and prevent the ills of cancellation *
(but the very thing which makes this desirable, i.e., the war, makes
undesirable the use of tires and gasoline travelling to county seats
farther removed).
(4) Designation of separate civil and criminal,
terms except in counties where there is pretty definite assurance of a
full and largely indestructible calendar might well be abandoned and a
mixed term substituted so that all judicial business could be disposed
of by one judge and often in one week.2 1* (5) We do not well distribute the work of the judges we have and for the piesent we probably
have too many, so that purely from the standpoint of getting the work
done, there was no need for C. 5822* giving the governor power to
reappoint the special judges and from that point of view alone there
was no cause for him to reappoint them pursuant to that authority
(but, of course, good men are encouraged to enter the public service
if they are given some continuity of employment and there is some
value in stand-by facilities as the electric light and power people well
enough know). (6) At any rate, there would be no public good but
only wasteful politics to be served by filling new judicial vacancies
as they may occur for the duration. As to the regular bench, legis"*Judge Marshall T. Spears charges some of the unwarranted continuances
to the rotation system. A Critical Discussion of the North Carolina Superior

Court System (1941) 8 JouR. & PRoc. N. C. STATE BAR 20, 22. Although, in the
same address, he describes the superior court judges as seriously overworked,
he also recognizes that terms are often called off with no possibility of utilizing

the released machinery by arranging a calendar for a special term even in the
same district. Id,at 24.
20 But N. C. CoxsT. Art. IV, §11, requires at least two terms annually in each
county.
21* This is the view expressed in a letter from Mr. Charles L. Coggin, Solici-

tor of the Fifteenth Judicial District (now presumably Solicitorial District,-see
C. 261). It would require amending legislation.

2* Re-.enacting N. C. Pub. L. 1941, c. 57; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp.
1941) §1435(Cd). The statutory provision for emergency judges-these being the
retired judges who are able to serve-(see N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§§1432 (a), 3884(a), and N. C. Coxsr. Art. IV, §11) created a reservoir which can
be dipped into in time of unexpected need. Presumably the legislative policy is
that it should be utilized only at such a time or the judges would have been kept
longer on active duty. There is some talk that since the emergency judges receive
extra compensation when on the bench, their active brethren feel a certain obligation to step aside now and then and create an emergency,--"give the boys on
the extra board a run or two," as it would be on the railroad. Whether the reported judicial desire to "spread the work" would be found if, like grammar
school teachers, they had to pay for their substitutes, is not so clear. So far as
there is the least tendency in that direction now it represents not only shirking
of official duty but a violation of considered legislative policy. That there are
individual instances (Mr. Justice Holmes'at ninety, for a conclusive example) of
retired and presumptively mentally worn out judges who surpass in acuteness as
well as wisdom many of their fellows at forty-five does not change the over-all

picture and policy.
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lation requires that vacancies be filled at the next general election. *
There is no such requirement as to the post of. special judge. Indeed
the policy is to make appointments definitely contingent on need for
the service. 2 4* The governor wisely seems to have considered that fact
when he omitted to fill one vacancy caused by death in the roster of
special judges for the 1943-45 biennium. It would seem to be his public
duty to pursue the same course should other vacancies occur and meanwhile to send unoccupied judges to crowded counties to hold special
25
terms to clean up the dockets there. *

Domestic Relations Courts
C. 470 amends the law relative to domestic relations courts established pursuant to Section 1461 (f) and 1461 (g)l in several respects.
3* N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1434. One lawyer of long experience
has expressed the seemingly valid opinion that it would be short sighted economy
to make reductions in this group. He says in a letter: "I do not favor reducing
the number of regular Superior Court Judges. The present condition is doubtless
to a large extent temporary and the state can better afford the expense of having
judges whose time is inadequately taken up, than pursue a course which in a
few years would carry us back to the condition which has existed during most of
my thirty years of law practice, when the Superior Court Judges have had too
heavy a volume of work. I do not mean that they have overworked themselves.
But I mean that they have had too many terms of court per year to give to their
work the reflection and consideration which it deserves: When a lawyer wishes
to present to a judge some equity matter not on the regular docket, such as an
injunction, and has to wait around the court during a criminal or even a civil
,term, in order to snatch some few minutes of a tired judge's time at the end of
the day, the client's business is not properly attended to. I think that the Superior
Court Judges would on the whole do their work more efficiently if they held
court for three weeks out -of the month and had one week for chambers matters,
study or even relaxation."
Another has pointed out that due to the decline in criminal business "the work
of solicitors has been shortened more than that of the judges (who must be available for both civil and criminal terms)."
"*This is forcibly disclosed in the history and wording of the legislation.
In the first place the statute is, and for sixteen.years has been, of a temporary
character in force only from session to session. It originally commanded the

governor to appoint four special judges. "The Governor . . . shall appoint . . "

N. C. Pub. L. 1927, c. 206, §1. It was thereafter amended to be only permissive
as to these four offices. "The Governor . . . may appoint . .

."

N. C. Pub. L.

1933, c. 217, §1. (Though the title in the Codes continues inaccurately to be,
"Governor to Make Appointment. . !' N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §1435(d) ;
N. C. CODE (Legis. Ed. 1943) §7-54.) It also originally "authorized and empowered" the governor to appoint not exceeding two additional special judges "if in
his judgment the necessity exists therefor" and that wise restriction has been
continued throughout although the number in 1941 was raised to four. N. C.
Pub. L. 1941, c. 52. Since the whole statute is now permissive the added caution
in the second part emphasizes the will of the legislature to have flexibility based
on need and that includes contraction as well as expansion, a thought which appointing officials are often slow to get.
."* The present governor might be expected to lend his support and exercise
his powers-see N. C. CODE AN. (Michie, 1939) §1450-to their constitutional
limit toward the improvement of the efficiency of the judicial system in the light
of his criticism of its delays and wasted time in an address before the State Bar
in Octbber, 1942. 9 Proc. N. C. State Bar-. See reference to this criticism in
the remarks of Mr. Robert Moseley (1943) REP. N. C. BAR Ass'N. 44, 49.
'Of N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939).
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(1) It extends the jurisdiction of the court to cases involving the
desertion, abandonment or non-support by an adult of a "minor child"
(2) It provides for the selection of a
rather than of a "juvenile."
substitute judge to serve during the absence or illness of the regular
judge, at a per diem to be fixed by the appointing body. (3) It adds
a new section making such courts courts of record, requiring them to
adopt a seal and- to keep dockets and records of proceedings. The
judges and clerks of such courts are empowered to administer oaths and
to issue warrants and other process in their courts. (4) Cases involving
the custody of juveniles will, upon appeal to the Superior Court, be
tried de novo, as in the case of appeals in criminal and bastardy cases.
Juvenile Courts
C. S. 5040 established juvenile courts in every county, as a part of
the Superior Court, and made the clerks of the Superior Court the
juvenile court judges, with the proviso that where the county seat was
a city of 25,000 or more population, such city might combine its
juvenile court with that of the county and by joint action elect a
juvenile court judge other than the clerk of court for terms of one
year, the salary of such judge to be apportioned. C. S. 5062 made it
mandatory for every city having a population of 10,000 or more according to the census of 1920 to establish and maintain a juvenile court,
and while it was provided that such cities might by agreement with
the county commissioners combine with the county in establishing a
joint court, there was no provision for a judge other than the clerk
of the Superior Court. C. 594 authorizes cities of less than 25,000 to
combine with the county in setting up a juvenile court, the judge of
which may be a person other than the clerk of the Superior Court.
Such judge, and also an asisstant judge, have all the powers of a
clerk of the Superior Court acting as juvenile judge and also all powers
of a judge of the city juvenile court under C. S. 5062. Terms of the
judge and assistant judge are to be for one year, and salaries are to be
fixed by the county commissioners but prorated between the city and
county according to agreement.
Terins i Cities of 35,000
C. S. 1443 provides that a Superior Court shall be held by a judge
thereof at the courthouse in each county, i.e., at the county seat. C. 121
amends this statute by making provision for sessions or terms of the
superior court in cities, other than the county seat, which have at least
35,000 inhabitants according to the last federal census. This amendment constitutes a drastic change in the law and represents an attempt
by the legislature to expedite court business by relieving congestion in
the counties which have large urban centers.
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Upon the clerk of the superior court of the county in which such
city (or cities) is located devolves the duty of preparing the dockets
of cases, both civil and criminal, to be tried in the city. The dockets,
and summons and processes are to be labelled so as to indicate that
the city is the place of trial. This is accomplished by the use of the
word "Division" after the name of the city, i.e., "High Point Division."
For the purpose of determining the proper place of trial of cases,
the county in which such a city is situated is to be divided into territorial divisions. The territory embraced in the division in which each
said city is located is made up of the township wherein the city lies
and other townships of the county, each of which has one or more
common boundary lines with the township which contains the city. Such
division of the superior court will be indicated by the name of the city.
All other townships of any such county constitute the territorial limits
of a superior court division to be known by the name of the county seat
followed by the word "Division."
It is also provided that the laws now or hereafter in effect for the
purpose of determining the proper venue as between the superior
courts of the several counties of the state shall apply for the same
purpose as between the divisions within a county and as between such
divisions and other divisions of the superior court in North Carolina.
Cases instituted in any municipal or county court may not be removed
from such court to any such division of the superior court except upon
the written consent of all parties litigant, or of their attorneys, or with
the permission of the judge of the municipal or county court. The
judge of said court may permit removal if, in his discretion, he finds
that such action will promote the ends of justice and the convenience
of witnesses.
The grand jury for the several divisions of court in any county
must be drawn from the whole county and may hold hearings either in
the county seat or elsewhere in the county or as it may be directed
by the judge holding any term of the superior court within such county.
However, the statute provides that in the arrangement of criminal
terms of court, a term of one week or more to be held at the county
seat shall precede-any-term of one week or more to be held in such
city, so as to facilitate the work of the grand jury and confine its meetings to the county seat so far as is practicable. All petit jurors for all
terms of court in the several divisions are also to be drawn from the
whole county.
Special terms for the trial of either civil or criminal cases may be
arranged in the manner now provided for the holding of such terms.
All court records of such divisions of the superior court are to be
kept in the clerk's office at the county seat, subject to temporary re-
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moval to any division under the supervision of the clerk. Judgments
rendered in any city division do not become a lien on real estate until
docketed in the office of the clerk at the county seat. It is expressly
provided that the new law shall not affect the provisions of C. S. 613
governing the docketing of liens and that the equities therein provided
for shall be preserved as to all judgments and orders rendered at any
term of the superior court in any such city.
The statute provides that the board of county commissioners of the
county in which such city is located shall provide a suitable place for
holding terms of court and shall provide for the payment of extra expenses incurred by the clerk and the sheriff and their staffs in attending such terms; also for the feeding and housing of prisoners awaiting
trial.
Pending litigation in any superior court is not affected by the
act except that attorneys may ask for the removal of cases to the new
division by written petition filed with the clerk prior to the time
such cases are calendared for trial.
At present this statute is applicable only to the city of High Point,
it being the only city in the state, outside of a county seat, which has
a population of 35,000. A division of the superior court has already
been set up in this city. It will facilitate the trial of cases in Guilford County where under the old law all superior court cases had to be
tried in Greensboro with the ensuing inconvenience to High Point
attorneys, litigants, and witnesses..
CRIMINAL LAW
Setting Fire to Woodlands
C. S. 4309 makes it a misdemeanor for any person intentionally to
set fire to any grass land, brush land or woodland of another, or to his
own land without first giving notice to adjoining landowners and taking
care to watch and control the fire. C. 661 amends the section by making
the crime a felony if willful or malicious intent is shown, punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for not less than one nor more
than five years.
DEPOSITIONS
C. 160 amends C. S. 1809 to permit officers of the U. S. Army,
Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, and Merchant Marine to take,
without commission issuing from the court, depositions of persons in
the armed services. No official seal is required of such officers, who,
in order to take depositions, must have attained such rank as is indicated in C. 159 which amends C. S. 3294 with reference to acknowledgments, already discussed herein. The statute also validates depositions
hitherto taken by such officers.
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DIVORCE
The process of whittling away our basic social institution, marriage,
was continued when the legislature reduced the residence requirement
for divorce from one year to six months.
A century ago the general residence requirement for divorce was
three years.' A later requirement of two years2 was halved in 1933. 8
C. 448 halves it again. As recently as 1919 where the ground for
divorce was "separation" in the sense of desertion the residence requirement was ten years. 4 In 1921 this was cut to five years, 5 in 1933 to
one, 6 and C. 448 makes it six months. Divorce for voluntary separation
began in 1931 with a residence requirement of five years,7 which was
reduced to one,8 and, by C. 448, to six months.
Vernier, publishing in 1932, indicated that at that time the residence
requirement varied in the different states from three months to five
years. The period in thirty-three jurisdictions was one year. 9 Considerable "progress" has been made since, as witness the fact that the
Nevada requirement was then listed as three months, and the North
Carolina requirement as two years. -Nevada has since halved her requirement ;3o North Carolina, as above indicated has since halved hers
twice.
When our general residence requirement was still three years, our
supreme court said, "The principal reason of the enactment was to prevent our Courts from being made the easy instruments of obtaining
divorces by persons not residing in the State-to prevent citizens of
other States from using our Courts for purposes they could not attain
in their own; in other words, to prevent frauds in these matters."' 1
Perhaps to date the cutting and recutting of the residence period merely
indicates a relaxation of this policy. It is common knowledge, however,
that in some states the exact reverse of such a policy has been embraced; by cutting the period below that of other states and making
the proof of grounds for divorce actually a mere form, these states have
opened their courts for the business of severing marriages at a profit.
12
The profit, of course, comes from the divorce-seeking transients. *
Further, the Supreme Court of the. United States has buttressed the
business. 13* It is to be hoped that our legislature will stop short of a
bid for any of it.
IN. C. REV. STAT. (1837) C. 39, §6.,
'N. C. REWsAL (1905) §1563.
N. C. Pub. L. 1933, C. 71.
-N. C. Pub. L. 1921, C. 63.

N. C. Pub. L. 1931, C. 72.

'N. C. CON. STAr. (1919) §1659(4).
'N. C. Pub. L. 1933, C. 71.
8

N. C. Pub. L. 1933, C. 163.

12 VERMER,
AmICAN FAMILY LAWS (1932) §82.
is now six weeks. NEv. Comp. LAWs (Supp. 1941) §9460.

%'It

Schonwald v. Schonwald, 55 N. C. 367, 369 (1856).

"2*The local courts find them to be "residents."
are no courts to try courts for fraud.

It is regrettable that there

'l,
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 63 Sup. Ct. 207, 87 L. ed. 189
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EVIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF PSYCHIATRISTS
The North Carolina statute requiring health certificates of applicants for marriage licenses provides that if either applicant has been
adjudged epileptic or of unsound mind, license to marry shall be
granted only after sterilization.' C. 641 by amendment creates an
exception where the applicant thus adjudged of unsound mind "has been
adjudged of sound mind by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon the
recommendation of one or more practicing physicians who specialize
in psychiatry."
This amendment is of little importance to our law of marriage;
the change is minor and obvious. The great significance of this small
amendment is that it requires that the subsequent adjudication of sanity
be upon the recommendation of a psychiatrist. This may be the beginning of a major change in our law. In order to see the significance
of this statute it must be placed in its legal background. The statute is
at the very least a fragment of a large, important, and pressing development, namely the reaction of law to modern science. One of the points
of contact where such reaction takes place is the place in law of the
testimony of scientific experts.
The law has by no means hastened to set aside for experts the function of giving testimony on matters within the fields of their scientific
knowledge. Whereas one might expect that the testimony of men of
science would be a universally prized resource of the law, a bright
spot in the field of the administration of justice, the reverse is true.
Expert testimony as actually used has drawn the fire of bar associa2
tions, commentators, judicial councils, courts, and even the experts.
A sample of the general discontent is to be found in the words of the
Illinois court, "That class of evidence, however, is generally discredited
and regarded as the most unsatisfactory part of judicial administration. This is with good reason, because the expert is often the hired
partisan and his opinion is a response to a pecuniary stimulus.
The field of medicine is not an exact science, and the expert being
(1942). The case involved a man and woman, each of whom was married and
resided in North Carolina, who went to Nevada, resided in an auto court six
weeks, obtained divorces, married each other, returned to North Carolina, and
were convicted of bigamous cohabitation. This was reversed in the United States
Supreme Court. The point decided was that a person wrongfully leaving his
spouse and acquiring a domicile in another state may obtain a divorce there on
the basis of substituted service which divorce will be entitled to full faith and
credit in the state where the abandoned spouse resides. The Court, however, left
undecided the question whether the North Carolina courts could refuse to recognize the Nevada divorce on the ground that the purported Nevada residence was a
fraud.
'N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2500(k).
2 Note (1938) 38 CoL. L. REV. 369. Cf. Hulbert, Psychiatric Testimony in
Probate Proceedings (1935) 2

LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 448.
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immune from penalties for perjury, his opinion is too often the
natural and expected result of his employment." 3
If human beings in the mass have a mass mind it is a mind not
given to foresight and reflection. Otherwise it might have ,been perceived in advance that under a system of litigation in which the litigants could obtain their own experts to come in and testify, the resulting expert testimony would not necessarily be of a high order. Not
every student who studies a science or any other specialized branch of
knowledge imbibes it completely and comprehends it accurately and
thoroughly. Experts are turned out who are not, and never will be,
very expert. Some, including scientists of wide reputation, lack common sense and sound judgment, whatever the extent of their information may be. Some whole departments of scientific study seem to be
afflicted with intellectual fads which are mistaken for verified ultimate
truths. Further, althought science may be devoted to truth, some scientists are liars. More of them color their views according to what is
profitable for themselves. In numberless lawsuits experts hired by one
litigant say one thing, and the experts of the other litigant say the
opposite.
This is not to say that the testimony of scientists lacks unique
value, nor that because it is "generally discredited" it must continue
to be. Scientists are human beings, and are subject to such human
weaknesses as untruthfulness, unsound judgment, too ready acceptance
of transient viewpoints, and the like; still they are no more subject to
such weaknesses than are other people; perhaps, by reason of the
nature of their training, less so than average; and they have the advantage of far more than ordinary information in their specialized fields.
The task of the law is to find means of putting to use the greater
knowledge of the scientist while at the same time holding to a minimum. the infusion of the human weaknesses of the man.
One means of eliminating bias from the testimony of experts is to
have neutral experts appointed by the court, rather than allowing the
parties to hire their own.4 Standing alone such a measure does not
seem to be a solution of the problem. It eliminates bias in favor of the
litigant hiring the expert, but other human weaknesses crop up. Politics, favoritism, and nepotism may enter into the appointments. 5 In
some European countries where experts who testify in criminal cases
are selected by the court from an approved list, it has been found that
political considerations enter into the process of getting on the list;
BOpp. v. Pryor, 294 Ill. 538, 545, 128 N. E. 580, 583 (1920).
Note (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 369 commenting on the Uniform Expert Testimony Act.

'Overholser, The History and Operation of the Briggs Law of Massachusetts
(1935) 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PoB. 436.

350
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further, the defendant has no adequate check on the expert who testifies
against him; and the bias in favor of the litigant has merely made way
for another bias, since the experts tend to regard it as their duty to
help convict.0 Anyone who has observed the desire of state's attorneys
to obtain convictions will understand a similar motivation on the part
of state's experts.
A large field for the use of expert testimony is in the legal process
of determining whether or not a particular person is, or was, sane.
This may be necessary for such purposes as to determine whether a
will is valid, whether a criminal is responsible, whether a marriage is
valid, whether a contract is binding, whether a person should be confined in an asylum, and the like. In this field is developing -a method
of utilizing experts which promises considerable improvement over the
old method of hired experts on each side in a litigation. In some states
where the defense of insanity is raised in a criminal case statutes provide for committing the defendant to a state hospital for the insane for
observation over a period of time and report to the court. The plan
has obvious 'advantages; it tends to eliminate partisan bias, favoritism,
and other improper considerations in the naming of experts, and the
errors and shortcomings of individual experts; further, it affords a
better opportunity for the experts to make their observations than does
a single examination. If coupled with suitable provisions for receiving
these reports in evidence with the right of cross examination of the
doctor in charge of their preparation, so as to eliminate the necessity
for hypothetical questions and other legal impediments on scientific
testimony, statutes such as the above should contribute to the adjustment of this contact between law and modem science. Actual experience has shown that these statutes work as well in practice as they
promise in theory to work.7 * The principle is not confined to insanity
cases; other matters within the scope of scientific testimony could be
referred to established institutions or groups already existing in the
particular scientific field.
In the absence of statute it is the general rule, in North Carolina8
6

Ploscowe, The Expert Witness in Criminal Cases in France, Gernmany, and

Italy (1935) 2 LAW & CoNTrMP. PROB. 504.
"*Weihofen, An Alternative to the Battle of Experts: Hospital Examination
of Criminal Defendants Before Trial (1935) 2 LAw & CONTM P. PROB. 419. Cf.
Overholser, supra note 5. Overholser points out that the Briggs Law has the
advantage that in capital cases, and in the cases of certain types of repeaters,
examination by the Department of Mental Diseases is automatic, unless the prisoner objects; insanity need not have been first put in issue. This is a good feature because a mental defect may exist without anyone having been aware of it.
Under both the Briggs Law and the statutes providing for committal to a
state hospital for observation and report, the results are usually accepted both by
the state and the defense; where the report is that the defendant is sane, but the
defense nevertheless asserts insanity, juries usually accept the official report.
' In re Rawlings' Will, 170 N. C. 58, 86 S. E. 794 (1915); see In re Craig,

192 N. C. 656, 657, 135 S. E. 798, 799 (1926).
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and elsewhere9 that witnesses who are not medical practitioners of any
kind may testify as to the sanity of a person. On the question whether
a general practitioner may testify on matters within a particular field
of science wherein specialists may presumably be had, Wigmore took
a strong position in favor of admitting the testimony of a general
practitioner rather than requiring that of a specialist. "The liberal
doctrine should be insisted on that the law does not require the best
possible kind of witness," etc.10 This argument is perfectly sound where
a case has arisen on facts already transpired, and those who have knowledge of the facts are not specialists. It loses force where a present
condition is to be examined, and the question arises as to who shall do
the examining. Thus where, in a will case, the question arises as to
whether a testator now deceased was sane when he made the will, the
testimony of a physician or even a layman is properly admitted for it
would be the exceptional case in which a specialist, a psychiatrist, knew
the testator and could testify about him. But when the question arises
whether a person now alive and present is sane, there is less-reason
for being content with testimony short of that of a specialist, if one be
available. Nevertheless the great bulk of state statutes in certain
proceedings to determine sanity of a person alive and available, such
as a proceeding to commit a person to an institution as a mental
defective, either require the testimony of physicians or their presence
on the examining body, but make no requirement that they be specialists
in mental diseases, psychiatrists, or psychologists. A growing minority
requires such specialists, or at least provide for them in the alternative.
Thus a statute may provide for two physicians or one physician and one
psychologist. 11* North Carolina is numbered with the great majority
which requires nothing more than the testimony of one or more physicians in order to determine that a person is insane, and should be
committed to an institution, or that a person has become sane, and should
be freed. 12 * Further, an inquisition of lunacy is provided for, by which
'2 WiGMoRF., EvmcC (3d. ed. 1940) §568.
I°
d. id.
§569.§2090 presents the substance of statutory provisions for determining
S1*7
sanity in many states. Wigmore points out that the usual requirement is the

testimony of two physicians.
12 Temporary restraint of insane persons requires the request of "Two duly
licensed physicians!' N. C. CoD ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2304(gg). Committal

to a state hospital for the insane requires the testimony of at least one licensed
physician, Id. §§6192, 6196. Committal on application of the patient requires the
certificate of a licensed physician. Id. §6209. Committal to a private hospital

instead of the state hospital at the election of the patient may take place if "two

respectable physicians" deem it proper. Id. §6222. Another provision for commitment to a private hospital requires the affidavit of a physician. Id. §6226. The
juvenile court may commit a child to an institution if found mentally defective
on examination by "two licensed physicians." Id. §5056. Discharge of insane
persons by the county commissioners takes place on the- certificate of "two respectable physicians." Id. §6213. Discharge from a hospital for the insane is
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a person may be found by a jury to be an idiot, inebriate, or lunatic and
a guardian may be appointed, without the requirement of any medical
testimony at all.' 3 In similar fashion restoration to sanity may be
determined. 1 4* Certain statutes providing for committal and discharge
of the criminal insane also are silent as to any requirement of medical
testimony, save that discharge upon habeas corpus requires the certificate of the several superintendents of the state hospitals.' 5
On the other hand, the statute providing for the asexualization or
sterilization of mental defectives requires that the chief medical officer
of each of two state hospitals for mental defectives be on the board
having power to authorize such operations1O
This brief survey of the broad field of the law into which C. 641 fits
should serve to underline a number of conclusions. First, this statute
requiring the recommendation of a psychiatrist for an adjudication of
restored sanity if the adjudication is to warrant a marriage license
without submitting to sterilization is an innovation in North Carolina
law. Second, the innovation is of exceptional importance, for it occurs at
a contact point between law and the rapidly developing science of psychiatry. Third, psychiatry has thereby made only one tiny advance into
a large field of the law. Sanity is an issue for many legal purposes far
more important than the one involved in C. 641. Fourth, in other
states this science is advancing farther into the legal field. Fifth, the
relatively small step taken by C. 641 is also a faltering step, since
experience shows that scientific testimony without development of better
17
means for its use fails to realize its possibilities. *
HEALTH AND SANITATION
Drainageof Streams and Swamps
C. 553 permits the board of county commissioners of any county
having a population in excess of one hundred thousand persons, upon
a finding that the cleaning out and draining of any portion of any nonnavigable stream, creek or swamp is necessary or desirable as a health
measure and that the agricultural benefits from such cleaning and drainupon the certificate of the superintendent, id. §6214, who, in the case of the state

hospitals, is required to be "a skilled physician, educated to his profession." (This
may mean simply the profession of a physician.) Id. §6173.
'Id. §2285.
"*Id. §2287. In relation to this provision the effect of C. 641 would seem to
be that the determination that sanity has been restored would have to be on the
recommendation of a psychiatrist before it would suffice for the purpose of obtaining a marriage license without submitting to sterilization.
m Id. §§6236-6239.

" Id. §2304(q).

further defect in statutes like C. 641 which merely call for the testimony
of a psychiatrist is that qualifications of such specialist are not prescribed. Cf.
lrA

Strauss, The Qualification of Psychiatrists as Experts in Legal Proceedings

(1935) 2

LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB.

461.
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ing would be so negligible as not to justify the levying of special assessments against the land in the area, to proceed to drain and clean out such
creek or swamp. The work is to be done under the supervision of the
health department, or any sanitary committee or other appropriate
agency. A county-wide ad valorem tax of not over 2c on the $100
valuation may be levied for the purpose.
Tuberculosis Control
C. 357 is a rather loosely written act that seeks to accomplish a
desirable end: to make the precautionary instructions of a county board
of health to tuberculosis carriers enforceable. It reads: "Any person
having tuberculosis in the communicable form who, after being instructed by an agent of the county board of health as to precautions
necessary to be taken to protect the members of such person's household or the community from becoming infected by tuberculosis communicated by such person, shall wilfully refuse to follow such instructions shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be imprisoned in the Prison Department of the North Carolina
Sanatorium for a period of sixty days for the first offense, and for a
period of six months for any subsequent offense."
It will be noted that the act does not require the agent's instructions
to be authorized by the county board of health, or uniform in such
cases, or even to be reasonable in their requirements. However, the
courts before whom such cases would be heard would undoubtedly serve
as a check against any abuses that might arise.
HOSPITALS AND MENTAL INSTITUTIONS
C. 136 makes two changes with respect to the affairs of the State'
mental institutions. The first change is minor: it concerns the mechanics of changing the line which divides the territory of the State
Hospital at Raleigh and the territory of the State Hospital at Morganton. The second change is of major importance: it provides a brand
new managerial system for these state institutions.
Under the former law (C. S. 6159 (a), (b) and (c)), the state
hospitals at Morganton, Raleigh and Goldsboro, and the Caswell
Training School at Kinston each had its own separate board of directors
or trustees, of nine members each, appointed by the Governor and subject to confirmation by the senate. The act sets up a- single, unified
board of directors composed of sixteen members. The state is loosely
divided into western, central and eastern sections, and the Governor is
directed to appoint one woman and four men from each section, but not
more than one from any county. The board is divided into five classes of
three members each, and first terms are from one to five years, succes-
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sors to each class to be appointed for five years. The sixteenth member
of the board is the Secretary of the State Board of Health, e " officio.
Appointments are subject to confirmation by the next session of the
senate. The Governor may remove any member without assigning
cause. The new board succeeds to all the powers and duties of the
several old boards, and is further authorized to employ, for two years
terms, a general superintendent of mental hygiene and prescribe his
duties and fix his salary. The general superintendent "shall be a person
of demonstrated executive ability and a doctor of medicine who shall
have had special education, training and experience in psychiatry and
in the treatment of mental diseases, and he shall be a person of good
character and otherwise qualified to discharge his duties." The board
may also employ a general business manager, to have charge of the
fiscal affairs and business personnel of all of the institutions, and it
may establish a system of out-patient clinics. The board itself is
designated as "North Carolina Hospitals Board of Control." From
among its own members, the board is to select an executive committee
of at least three members for each institution.
Although a common management is thus provided for the four
institutions, each continues to be a separate corporation.
C. 780 is an 18-page Act whose title gives a fair synopsis of its contents: "An Act to declare the necessity of creating public bodies corporate and politic to be known as hospital authorities to engage in
hospital construction, maintenance and operation and/or projects to
provide hospital accommodations; to provide for the creation of such
hospital authorities; to define the powers and duties of hospital authorities and to provide for the exercise of such powers, including acquiring
property by purchase, gift or eminent domain, and including borrowing
money, issuing revenue and credit bonds and other obligations, and giving security therefore; to confer remedies on obligees of hospital authorities; to provide that hospital authorities, and certain property and
securities thereof shall be tax exempt."
The act provides in detail the method of creating hospital authorities,
and their functions, powers and duties after they have been set up.
An authority may be set up by resolution of the governing body of a
city having a population of more than 75,000 according to the last
federal census, and when created it would embrace territory for a distance of ten miles beyond the corporate limits of the city, except that
it shall not include territory within another city of 75,000 or more
population, nor any territory within a previously created authority.
Upon the adoption of the resolution finding a need for an authority,
the mayor is required to appoint a commission of eighteen members
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which shall apply to the Secretary of State for a certificate 'of incorporation.
The act provides that the power of eminent domain shall not be
exercised except upon a certificate of public convenience and necessity
issued by the Utilities Commission. Authorities are expressly exempt
from the provisions of the Local Government Act and the County
Fiscal Control Act. Any city or county in which an authority is
located is authorized to appropriate up to five per cent of its general
fund for the benefit of the authority.
The act is specifically made applicable to Craven County and the
City of New Bern "as fully as if the population of said county exceeded
seventy-five thousand inhabitants."
INSURANCE-GROUP
North Carolina's inadequate'* statute on group life insurance2 was
expanded somewhat by C. 597. Hitherto the statute so defined group
life insurance that only insurance on groups of employees was included,3 and made it unlawful to make a contract of life insurance covering a group in the state except as provided in the statute. 4 C. 597
adds as insurable groups borrowers and their guarantors from one
creditor, and purchasers from one vendor, where payment is to be
made in installments over a period not exceeding ten years. Included
in the statutory details is a provision for payment to the creditor of
the proceeds of the insurance, to be applied to the satisfaction of the
debt. C. 597 largely follows verbatim a New York statute. 5 Obviously
the statute makes possible the elimination of one hazard to a large
lender or seller on the installment plan, namely risk arising by reason
of the deaths of some of the debtors. By requiring as part of the bargain with each debtor that he become insured under the group plan
for the amount of his debt, his death results in payment to the creditor.
The wisdom of the policy of limiting group insurance to particular
groups authorized by statute has been questioned ;6 it would appear to
be better to adopt the reverse policy. Instead of specifying a limited
number of groups and excluding all others, it might be well to allow
companies to insure groups generally, with limitations designed to
prevent unsound practices, such as, for example, forming a group for
the express purpose of taking insurance on it without medical examinations.
l* Improvements in group insurance law are suggested by Hanft, Group Life
Ihmurance: Its Legal Aspects (1935) 2 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 70.
2N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §6466(a)-(d).
*Id. §6466(a).
"Id. §6466(b).
'N. Y. INs. LAW §204(c).
' Hanft, supra note 1, at 73.
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INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Answering a crying need that had become greatly aggravated since
the outbreak of war, especially in and around defense centers and military camps, C. 339 establishes a state-wide prohibition of the sale of
beer and wine between the hours of 11:30 P.M. and 7:00 A.M. every
day, and consumption on the premises between the hours of 12:00
Midnight and 7:00 A.M. every day. The act goes further and permits
counties, with respect to their territory outside of the boundaries of
incorporated places, and municipalities, with respect to the territory
within their their borders, to regulate and prohibit sales between 11:30
P.M. on Saturday and 7:00 A.M. on Monday.
On its face the penal clause, section 4, is incomplete. It provides
that violations of the act, or violations of "any regulations which may
be made under this Act by the county commissioners of the county"
in which the violation occurs, shall be a misdemeanor punishable by
fine of not less, than $50 or imprisonment of not less than 30 days, or
both, and by the revocation of the beer and wine license. Nothing is
said concerning the punishment for violating regulations, that may be
made by municipalities pursuant to the act.
MINORS VIOLATING MOTOR VEHICLE LAWS
C. 346 having reduced the age of persons who may be licensed as
motor vehicle drivers from sixteen to fifteen years of age, C. 760 followed through by taking jurisdiction over violation of the motor vehicle laws by persons over fifteen (instead of over sixteen) away from
the juvenile courts and placing it in the courts that have jurisdiction
of such cases involving persons over sixteen years of age.
MOTOR VEHICLES
The war time pressure on automobile owners to share rides to save
gasoline appears to be responsible for an adjustment of the motor
vehicle statute. By C. 2021* vehicles operated by their owners on a
"share the expense" plan are apparently excluded from the definition
of "For Hire Passenger Vehicles" and the attendant obligations.2*
'* By its terms C. 202 amends that portion of section 2 of N. C. Pub. L. 1937,
c. 407 designated (2). The portion designated (r) (2). relates to freight haulers.
It is plain that the legislature intended to amend the portion designated (q) (2),
relating to for hire passenger vehicles, since the language of the amendment refers
to sharing "by the passengers" of the cost of operation.
'* For hire passenger vehicles carry a far higher tax rate than private passenger vehicles. Compare N. C. CoDn ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2621 (237) subsection (c) with subsection (e).
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Capital Reserves

C. 467 is entitled "An Act authorizing cities and towns to establish
capital reserve funds." C. 593 is entitled "An Act authorizing counties
to establish capital reserve funds." The two acts are identical in their
purpose and effect, and except for necessary differences in definitions
suitable to the unit involved and differences made necessary because
of different requirements for handling municipal and county funds, the
language of the two acts is identical. Both acts provide for the creation
of the capital reserve funds by resolution of the governing body of the
unit. Both acts provide for the approval and supervision of the Local
Government Commission in establishing, borrowing from, or withdrawing from the fund. Both acts require the itemization of the sources
of the funds placed in reserve, and both specify in detail the uses that
may be made of the funds. Both acts represent a departure from the
theory that it is dangerous to allow local governmental units to accumulate reserves; that it is wise and safer to empty the till by the
end of each fiscal year or reflect any surplus in the succeeding budget.
The two acts grew out of conditions created by the war and are
in anticipation of conditions that may come into being after the war
or before. Local units were finding that their revenues, under the same
tax rates, had not as yet seriously declined: some had even increased.
At the same time, normal new building was being held up because of
scarcity of labor and material and in keeping with the national policy,
and even normal repairs and replacements were being curtailed. Money
that would have been spent in normal times was piling up. In the
meantime, equipment, buildings and facilities were running down.
After the war there would be a great need for replacements and repairs, and for catching up on delayed expansions of service. To the
extent that the funds represent unspent maintenance and replacement
funds, they are truly capital reserves and will enable local units to keep
their capital investments intact. They will also be very helpful in relieving post war unemployment.
C. 14 has somewhat the same end in view. Some counties and
municipalities had obtained authorizations for bond issues, some had
sold bonds and then found that they were unable, because of shortages,
to buy the things or do the work for which bonds were issued. The
act authorizes the investment of such unused bond proceeds in bonds,
notes or certificates of indebtedness of the United States, or in bonds
or notes of any agency or instrumentality of the United States when
the principal and interest of such obligations are guaranteed by the
United States, or in bonds or notes of the State of North Carolina, or
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in bonds or notes of any county or municipality in North Carolina that
have been approved by the Local Government Commission. Earnings
from the investments may be applied to the payment of interest or
principal of the bonds from which the proceeds were derived, or may
be applied as an increment to such proceeds.
Taxi Licenses
C. 639 adds to the powers of cities and towns specific authority
to require taxicab drivers to obtain a driver's permit. Such permit
may be denied to anyone convicted of felony, or violation of federal
or state liquor, prostitution, or narcotics statutes, to aliens, habitual
users of liquor or narcotics, or habitual violators of traffic laws. For
similar reasons permits may be revoked. Cities and towns are empowered to license, regulate, and control taxicab drivers not only
within the city or town limits but also to regulate operators of taxicabs
between the municipality and points, not incorporated, within a radius
of five miles of the municipality. Further, cities and towns are authorized to make a levy of not over $15.00 per year upon each taxicab.
In view of the well known fact that some taxi drivers do not stop
at furnishing their customers transportation, but assist them in procuring other accommodations of an illegal and immoral kind,'* this statute appears to be both a valid and a timely delegation of the police power
to municipalities. Taxi drivers convicted of such offenses as aiding
prostitution, for example, should, and under this statute could, lose
their right to operate. Taxicabs are clearly within the range of necessary, appropriate, and reasonable police regulations.2 They may be
regulated as a class and be subjected to restrictions different from those
on other vehicles. 3 Cities may be empowered to require taxi drivers
to obtain licenses.4 * Refusal of renewal of a city license to a taxi driver
because he had been convicted of a felony has been sustained. A rehearsal by the court of some of the crimes for which applicants for
licenses as taxi drivers had been convicted sharply emphasizes the need
for protection of the public by excluding such drivers.S*
1* State v. Willis, 220 N. C. 712, 18 S. E. (2d)
118 (1942), and State v.
Johnson, 220 N. C. 773, 18 S. E. (2d) 358 (1942), will serve to illustrate. In
the first case taxi drivers were convicted of transporting soldiers to a place of
prostitution. In the second a taxi driver was convicted of aiding prostitution. He
had solicited customers for the house.
23 MCQUIIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1943) §993.
' Ibid.
'* Chicago v. Kluever, 257 Ill. 317, 100 N. 1. 917 (1913) (Ordinance requiring
examination and licensing of operators of motor vehicles for hire sustained).
'* Baldi v. Gilchrist, 204 App. Div. 425, 198 N. Y. Supp. 493 (1923). In
Glass v. State Board of Pub. Roads, 44 Rhode Island 54, 115 Atl. 244 (1921) the
court indicated that even an ordinary driver's license could be denied or revoked
whenever probable use of the car by the licensee would be detrimental to the public safety, welfare, or morals.

1943]

STATUTORY CHANGES IN N. C. IN 1943

The portion of the statute authorizing cities and towns to regulate
operators of taxicabs between the municipality and points within five
miles outside is not subject to legal objection on the ground that the
ppwer of the municipality is extended beyohd its boundaries. The legislature may grant cities and towns the right to exercise police regulations
beyond the corporate limits, 6 and it is not unusual to do so3 The
authorization of a city tax on taxicabs likewise appears valid.s*
PROPERTY
Revocation of Contingent Future Interests
C. S. 996 provides, in effect, that the grantor or settlor, who voluntarily or for a valuable consideration makes a conveyance of property
or sets up a trust for the benefit of a person or persons not in esse or
not determinable until the happening of some future event, may revoke
the grant of the future interest by a proper instrument to that effect.
This revocation must take place prior to the happening of the contingency vesting the future estates. This section, already much amended'
is further amended by C. 437 which provides that, as to instruments
hereafter executed creating such contingent interests, no revocation
thereof may be made if the instrument expressly provides that the
grantor, maker or trustor may not revoke such instrumfent. In other
words, section 996 no longer permits the revocation of instruments
hereafter made which expressly declare that they are irrevocable.
As to any instrument heretofore executed, whether or not it contains an express provision that it is irrevocable, C. 437 further provides
that the creator of such instrument must exercise his power of revocation or file an instrument with the trustee stating that it is his intention to retain the power to revoke under C. S. 996 within six months
after the effective date of C. 437-March 4, 1943; otherwise the power
of revocation given in C. S. 996 is destroyed. If the paper creating the
contingent interest is recorded, the revocation or declaration retaining
the power to revoke must also be recorded. It will be readily seen that
the new amendment wisely places some limits upon the hitherto unlimited power of revocation of instruments creating contingent future
interests.
Sale of Land by Heirs and Devisees of a Decedent
C. S. 76 provides that all conveyances of real property of a decedent
made by any devisee or heir at law within two years after the death of
' State v. Rice, 150 N. C. 635, 74 S. E. 582 '(1912).
3 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1943) §952.
8*
In State v. Quigk, 86 Fla. 51, 96 So. 8 (1923) a city license tax on operators of motor vehicles for hire was sustained. The court found the classifiication
to be reasonable and practicable.
19 N. C.
1 See comment upon the 1941 amendment to this section in (1941)

L. Rzv. 507.
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the decedent shall be void as to the creditors, executors, administrators
and collectors of such decedent, but such conveyances to bonafide purchasers for value and without notice, if made after two years from the
death of the decedent, shall be valid even against creditors. It is obvious
that the purpose of the statute is to protect the decedent's creditors
against sales by the heirs and devisees before the estate is settled. Although the statute provides that sales made within two years are void,
the supreme court has held that such conveyances are not absolutely
void but only conditionally so as against creditors in cases where the
personal property is not sufficient to pay the debts' It would seem to
follow that, if all the debts have been paid, such a conveyance would
be good even though made within the two-year period.
In the minds of title examiners the question has frequently been
raised as to whether a conveyance made within the two-year period is
good against the decendent's creditors after the expiration of the two
years. 2 This troublesome question has been answered in the affirmative by C. 411 which amends C. S. 76. C. 411 provides that such conveyances shall, as against creditors, "become good and valid to the
same effect as if made after the expiration of such time, unless in the
meantime an action or proceeding shall have been instituted in the
proper court to subject the land therein to payment of the decedent's
debts." Thus, in effect, the two-year period under the new law becomes
a statute of limitations against the decedent's creditors; and the title
of the heir's or devisee's grantee is, in this respect, stabilized.
The new law applies as well to conveyances made prior to its enactment as to those hereafter to be made with the exception that the
conveyances heretofore made, if invalid at that time, do not become
valid as against creditors until the expiration of six months from the
ratification of the Act-March 3, 1943. Pending litigation is not affected by the new law.
C. S. 76 is further amended by C. 763 which provides that a judicial
sale of the decendent's realty hereafter made under order of court for
petition shall be valid as to his creditors, executors, administrators and
collectors irrespective of the time when made. If such sale is made
within two years of the decedent's death or before the estate shall have
been filly administered, the decedent's personal representative must
be joined as plaintiff or made a party defendant. The court, in its order
confirming such sale, shall set aside such part of the proceeds thereof
as are necessary to pay the debts of the decedent by requiring the pay1
First National Bank of Henderson v. Zollicoffer, 199 N. C. 620, 155 S. E.
449 (1930) ; Davis v. Perry, 96 N. C. 260, 1 S. E. 610 (1887).
- For an excellent discussion of problems raised by C. S. 76, see Boyd, Some
Phases of Title Examination and Real Estate Practice (1942) 20 N. C. L. REV.

168, pp. 179-181.
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ment of the same to the personal representative, or to the court, to be
retained subject to the claims of creditors for a period of two years
from the date of the decedent's death, or until the estate is fully administered. It is further provided that personal representatives shall
be allowed commissions only on such proceeds coming into their hands
as are necessary to discharge the claims of creditors.
This statute, in effect, validates the titles of all purchasers of a
decedent's land sold under equitable partition proceedings-no matter
when such sale occurs with reference to the decedent's death. If the
sale is made within the two-year period, or before the estate is administered, creditors' claims are protected as against the heirs or devisees
by the provision requiring the impounding of a part of the proceeds of
the sale.
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Extended Term
C. 255 raises the state supported school term from eight to nine
months-a total of 180 days, with provision for a reduction by the
Governor to 170 days for the 1943-44 and 1944-45 terms if state revenues should suffer such a decline as to warrant such reduction. The
extension is provided for every county and school district "which shall
request the same." As many days as sixty may be suspended by the
State Board of Education or by the governing body of the administrative unit with approval of the State Board of Education because of a
low average of daily, attendance, or if the needs of agriculture or anyother condition shall make such suspension necessary within a unit or
district. Superintendents and others employed on an annual basis are
to be paid per calendar month, and upon request by any administrative
unit to the State Board of Education before October 1 of each calendar
year, teachers may be paid in twelve monthly installments. The State
Board of Education is authorized to call an extended recess or adjournment in certain emergencies. Local supplements may still be used
to raise the standard of local units or to employ additional vocational
teachers, but not to extend further the school term. For the support
of the ninth month there is appropriated the sum of $3,454,845 for
the first year, and $3,559,463 for the second year.
School Machinery Act Amendments
C. 720 amends the School Machinery Act of 1939, as amended, in
four particulars: it provides that in the allotment of teachers for union
schools-those embracing both elementary and high school gradesschools having four teachers or less shall not be reduced in the teacher
allotment for the duration of the war, where the State Board of Edu-
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cation determines that the reduction in enrollment is only temporary.
It relieves teachers and principals of the necessity of attending summer
school in 1943 or 1944 and preserves the validity of their certificates
notwithstanding non-attendance. It makes the rejection of a teacher
subject to the approval of the governing body of the administrative
unit. And it makes the pay of substitutes "not less than" $3 per day
instead of not over $3 per day. The act further directs the State Board
of Education to study the question of consolidating administrative units
with a view to greater economy and efficiency and to report to the next
General Assembly.
State Board of Education
Pursuant to the amendment to the state constitution adopted by the
people at the November, 1942 election, C. 721 creates a new State
Board of Education consisting of the Lieutenant Governor, the State
Treasurer, the Superintendent of Public Instruction and one member
from each congressional district to be appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the General Assembly. The new board succeeds
to all the powers and duties of the old board, and also to all the powers
and duties of the State School Commission, the State Textbook Commission, the State Board for Vocational Education and the State Board
of Commercial Education, which are abolished.
A majority of the members of the board "shall be persons of training and experience in business and finance, who shall not be connected
with the teaching profession or any educational administration of the
State." iVirst appointments from odd numbered tdistricts are for two
year terms, and from even numbered districts for four year terms; all
terms to be for four years thereafter. The Governor is to fill vacancies
for unexpired terms, without confirmation. The Superintendent of Public Instruction is to have general supervision over the school system and
is made secretary of the board. The fiscal affairs of the board are placed
under a comptroller who is to be appointed by the board, subject to
approval of the Governor, and serve at the will of the board.
SURETYSHIP
Preceded by a barrage of "whereases" the legislature enacted a requirement that henceforth whenever a seller requires of its agents or
representatives selling or handling its merchandise a bond or guaranty
or indemnity contract to secure payment of money collected, such contract shall state the maximum liability thereon and the period it is to
run, otherwise it shall be void and no action against the surety or
guarantor may be maintained in any court of this state. C. 604. The
"whereas" clauses recite that such bonds or guaranty or indemnity
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contracts are required by some concerns, often do not specify any
limit in time or amount, and are misleading and easily misunderstood.'*
The purpose of the "whereases" may have been to protect the act from
adverse court decision as to its constitutionality by acquainting the
court in advance with the facts which, in the opinion of the legislature,
made such a statute reasonable and justified placing this kind of suretyship in a special classification for the purposes of this regulation. Liberty of contract may be limited not only by prohibiting inclusion of
certain terms in contracts, but also by requiring that they include certain provisions.2 * The ultimate issue is the reasonableness of the particular restriction. Also, there may be no unreasonable classifications.
They are sustained unless facts are presented establishing their unreasonableness. 3 That the form of suretyship contracts may be subjected
to special requirements is evidenced by the long familiar statutory
provision that they be in writing.4
TAXATION
Coordination of Administration with Federal and State Governments
C. 747 is a little act with possibilities of amounting to a great deal
or nothing at all. It authorizes coordination of the administration and
collection of North Carolina taxes with those of the nation or of other
states and even of political subdivisions of other states.'* The immediate object of the act is understood to have been far narrower, i.e.,
if through it coordination is actually secured, to protect the states
against federal enticement of experienced state auditing and administrative personnel in the increasingly likely event of Congress passing a
sales tax or its equivalent. 2* But, as first suggested, the act has vastly
greater, even revolutionary, possibilities. No one who pays taxes,-and who doesn't nowadays ?-but has sometimes thought of the amazing
1* The legislature's opinion that such contracts may be used to trap the un,vary is fortified by the number of cases where such guaranties cover amounts
already due the seller from the agent, as well as future sums, and the amount
already, due is left blank when the guarantor signs, but is later filled in by the
seller. McConnon & Co. v. Mench, 235 Mich. 640, 209 N. W. 830 (1926);
notes (1925) 39 HARV. L. REv. 132, (1927) 25 MICH. L. REV. 290.
2* Statutory standard insurance policies are a familiar illustration. N. C. CODE
ANN. (Michie, 1939) §§6436, 6437.
1 ROTTSCHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERIcAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1939) 539.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §987.
'*Through agreements by the Commissioner of Revenue "with the approval
-of the Governor and Council of State." The act has possibilities of becoming
actually operative when agreements with other governments are concluded and
without further legislative action since Section 3 provides that "Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, returns shall be filed and taxes paid in accordance
with the provisions of any agreement entered into pursuant to this Act."
2 The impulse here is from the states, rather than from Washington as so
often of late with state legislation having national importance. It is understood
that the taxing authorities of California requested the passage of this bill.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

and wasteful duplication in much of the field. The insect bite which
itches most at the moment seems to be the federal auto use tax,5 though
the administration of that annoyance at the window of the-post office,
it must be confessed, is simple enough. Around March, 1944, the irritant
will be the two sets of income tax returns state and federal with just
enough differences so one set of calculations will not do for both. Now
is the time, while manpower and womanpower are scarce, to get some
simplification, some reduction of personnel. In the prospective day of excess workers and unemployment, politicians will find their interests best
served by having as many overlapping taxes to collect and as many appointments to make as possible. The present act with its sweeping possibilities notwithstanding its rather small range purpose may prove one
valuable implement for helping the good work. There is evidence of a
much larger attack on the whole problem getting under way in the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Report submitted to the Secretary of
4
the Treasury early this year.

Freight Car Lines
Ad valorem taxation of the rolling stock of tank, refrigerator, live
stock and other freight car lines which is leased by them to the railroads and operated in the state has not proved satisfactory'* and the
Department of Tax Research, following the lead of some other states, 2
proposed a substitute which throws the burden on the railroads 3 as
withholding agents. The tax is a 3% charge on the gross rentals paid
for the use of the cars in North Carolina service.4 * The railroads are
to make the calculations, withhold the amount due and pay it to the
'Editorial, Greensboro (N. C.) News, Aug. 30, 1943, p. 6.

'(May, 1943) 21 TAXES 250.
'* This is obviously true if each county is left to assess if it can the average
number of cars in use in its little territory. It is true also if the state assesses
and distributes to the counties. REP. N. C. DEP'- TAx RESEARCH (1942) 17; note
(1941) 35 IL. L. REv. 766. However, the validity of a tax on a properly calculated number of cars is no longer open to question on federal constitutional
grounds. Johnson Oil Rfg. Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U. S. 158, 54 S. Ct. 142, 78 L.
Ed. 238 (1933).
'See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) c. 72 (rate 301o); Kan. Sess. Laws 1943,
c. 289 (220%); MixN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1940) §2272 (7%, formerly 6%),
upheld in Almer Ry. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner of Taxation of Minn., 213
Minn. 62, 5 N. W. (2d) 637 (1942), appeal dismissed "for want of a substantial
federal question" 317 U. S. 605, 63 S. Ct. 524 (1943) notwithstanding certain
discriminatory features; Wis. STAT. (1941) §76.41 (6%).
18.
'REP. N. C. DEP'T TAX RESEARCH (1942)
* No effort was made to apply this tax to rolling stock of other railroad
companies because there is a rough balance between the states on these cars.
REP. N. C. DEe'T TAx RESEARCH (1942) 17. In the metaphor of Mr. R. C.
Beckett, General Attorney, Illinois Central System, Taxation of Railroad Cars
Ozmed by Railroad Companies as Compared %withRailroad Cars Owned by Other
Companies (1938) PROCEEDINGS NAT. TAX Ass'N. 166, when the doctrine of
mobila gave way, railroad system cars "jelled" for tax purposes over the area of
the railroad lines while cars of freight lines spread out over the whole field of
their meanderings.
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state. As recommended to the legislature by the Department, the new
levy was in lieu of property and other taxes. As passed, 5* it is in
lieu only of property taxes on the rolling stock, i.e., is a substitute for
Section 1604 of the Machinery Act, the ad valorem tax section.6 This
is as far as the substitutionary character of the tax need go under
Cudahy Packing Co. v. Min-nesota.7 Nevertheless some misgivings
were felt for the constitutionality of this innovation ( four tank car
companies had paid the corresponding Kansas tax under protest) 8 and
the legislature provided for the revival 9 of Section 1604, should the
new tax article be wrecked on constitutional rocks. Probably due to
the same fears our statute and a Kansas 'amendment of 1943 contain
some rather novel and mildly apologetic assurances that we don't really
mean to treat the transportation companies as badly as at first appears.
The Kansas statement takes the form of a provision that the gross
receipts tax is not to be greater than the ad valorem tax would be.io*
Which might lead one to inquire why the ad valorem tax was dropped
in the first place since it is unthinkable that they intended to collect
less than they had been collecting. But the probable answer is that
this scheme will in fact. get some revenue that*the other provided for
but didn't get and that it puts the burden on the car line to show that
its tax is greater than a maximum-value property tax on the cars would
be."l* Our conciliatory gesture in the new North Carolina statute is
r* C. 400, §8. Furthermore as recommended the act would have been a "fran-

chise or privilege tax" and would have become §2073/2 of the revenue law but as
passed it is a new schedule I-A and is designated a "gross earnings tax in lieu

of ad valorem taxes." And the rate recommended was 4% as in Oklahoma.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7971(185).
7246 U. S. 450, 38 S. Ct. 373, 62 L. Ed. 827 (1918).

'As appears from Kan. Sess. Laws 1943 c. 62, confirmed by letter from
James D. Dye, attorney of the State Commission of Revenue and Taxation, Sept,

13, 1943.
"C. 634, §3.
10* Kan. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 289, §5. This seems to be a necessary condition
to constitutionality under Cudahy Pkg. Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 7. It is not

an express ,provision of our act and so it might become a question of fact if the
act were tested. The rate in the Cudahy case was not mentioned by the Supreme
Court but seems to have been 4% for part of the period in question and 6% for

the remainder. Minn. Pub. Laws 1907, c. 250, §4 (4%)

1909, c. 473 (6%) ; 1911,

c. 377, §4 (6%). In Oklahoma where the rate was 4Vo such a .provision was incorporated to protect against federal unconstitutionality. A curious backfire

ensued. The tax was then judicially considered to be so far an ad valorem tax as
to run afoul of a state constitutional prohibition on ad valorem taxation for

state purposes. Pacific Fruit Exp. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 27 F. Supp. 279

(D. C. Okla. 1939), noted (1939) 37 MICH. L. Ray. 1348. The state tax com-

mission had not expected that result. Brown, The Gross Earnings Method of

Taxing Freight Lines (1938) PROCEEDINGS
17 TAXEs 288.

NAT.

TAX Ass'N. 188, 190, (1939)

* This is usually thought to permit something to be added above mere manufactured cost of the equipment to cover the value from its use as a part of a

going enterprise. See argument that this "unit rule" has no proper application

to freight car lines whose cars are leased to railroads because they are not then
operated as a part of any unified transportation enterprise of the freight line
company. Geo. A. Kelly, Vice-President Pullman Co. (1938) PROCEEDINGS OF
T E NAT. TAx Ass'N 178.
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by way of assurance that we don't intend to put the railroads to too
much trouble helping us about collecting our revenue and that the commissioner can accordingly "approve any method of accounting which
he finds to be reasonably adequate for determining the amount of mileage earnings" of the companies. But it goes farther and permits the
commissioner to collect direct and spare the railroads when he thinks
it can be satisfactorily done. If this means singling out individual
companies for special treatment it may be open to the charge of discrimination but the language apparently contemplates uniform action
one way or the other.
Inheritance Tax
Most of the significant amendments to the Revenue Law are found
to stem from the recommendations in the report of the recently created
Department of Tax Research headed by the former Commissioner of
Revenue, Mr. Maxwell. The first of these amendments was passed
to meet the inheritance tax situation created by the decision in Wachovia
Bank and Trust Co. v. Maxwell.' That decision interpreted the former
language of Section 112 as excluding from inheritance tax the proceeds
of life insurance where the deceased-insured had reserved none of the
incidents of ownership. New Section 11, following the lead of the
federal law,3 outlines an elaborate scheme for taxing (1) insurance
receivable by the executor regardless of other factors, (2) insurance
otherwise payable (a) in proportion to the amount of premiums paid
by deceased or (b) altogether when he retained incidents of ownership except with a pro rata reduction when a beneficiary paid the total
premium or some of it. Finally, gifts of money to pay premiums and
gifts of policies are reckoned with so as to prevent the assessing of
both full gift and inheritance taxation on the same ultimate financial
provision by the decedent.
The Wachovia decision, as above noted, was expressly an interpretative decision, yet the opinion paused long enough to inject a doubt
as to the constitutionality of any legislation which might undertake to
bring life insurance under the inheritance tax law when no incidents
of ownership were reserved in the insured, i.e. legislation of the type
now enacted.
In such cases nothing of value can be said to pass at death from
the deceased to the beneficiary since the deceased had nothing. 4* And
just because something passed to the beneficiary at the time of deceased's
death does not of itself create a shift of interests taxable as an in' 221 N. C. 528, 20 S. E. (2d) 840 (1942).
2

N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880 (11).
STAT. 944, 26 U.

'Fed. Rev. Act. 1942, §404, 56

S. C. A. §811(g) (Supp. -1942).
'*This distinguishes Chase Nat. Bk. v. United States 278 U. S. 327, 49 S. Ct.
126, 73 L. ed. 405 (1929), where insured could change the beneficiary.
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heritance. Insurance presents a special situation where the insured
pays the premiums. The monetary provision is from his assets and
the fruition is at his 'death. Of course if our gift and inheritance taxes
were coordinated and the rates and exemptions were the same we
could get a substantially equal aggregate tax 5* in cases where no incidents of ownership were reserved by treating the premium payments
as taxable gifts to the beneficiary and ignoring the amount ultimately
paid on the policyO* For practical and other reasons, however, our
choice has been to treat insurance paid for directly or indirectly 7* by
the insured as testamentary in character and to adjust our tax system
accordingly. Notwithstanding much past uncertainty,8 the expanded
act ought to pass constitutional inspection in a federal court whose
present attitude is one of benevolence toward legislation aimed to block
tax escape devices.9
License Taxes
The Department of Tax Research, impressed with the inequity of
requiring payment of a second license tax by the purchaser of a business which had already paid one for the whole year, recommended
that the so called license be made transferable in case of a sale. On
the ground, however, that in the case of certain businesses and profes-

sions, the license was a personal privilege to, e.g., the lawyer, doctor,
mortician or embalmer, real estate auctioneer, bill collector, peddler,

contractor or lightning rod agent, who paid for it, the Department of
Tax Research advised that no transfer be permitted in those cases and
offered a bill incorporating these features.1

The bill was passed as

offered. 2
These so called licenses, however, represent no grant of privileges.

If support were needed for that, another provision of the same section
'*Substantially equal because the total amount paid in as premiums on all
policies approximates the aggregate amounts paid over at death. The value to
the state of having the tax money sooner would tend to offset the amount lost
from not taxing the possibly added value from the company's net earnings.
'* If the insurance were payable to A if he survived the insured but otherwise
to B, gift taxation at the time of premium payments might prove impractical.
Taxing the premium payments as gifts, moreover, would discourage the purchase
of this kind of life insurance, a policy not in keeping with e.g. the Victory Tax
Credit, 56 STAT. 885 (1942), 26 U. S. C. A. §453 (Supp. 1942).
'* This language is found in both the North Carolina and the federal acts but
gifts by a husband to a wife to enable her to pay for the insurance seem likely
to be held indirect payments by the husband under the federal act, C. C. H. Inheritance, Estate and Gift Tax Service, Federal, (7th ed.)
3473.10; while a
special subsection excludes that interpretation in North Carolina if the gift tax
was paid by the husband. N. C. RnvEmuE L. §11(2) (b), N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1939) §7880(11) (2) (b).
' See Paul, FEDEAL, ESTATE AND G=F TAXATION (1942) §10.15.
' See C. C. H. Inheritance, Estate and Gift Tax Service, Federal, (7th ed.)
3473.57; State, (7th ed.) 1580 E.
'REP. N. C. DEP'T TAX REsEARcH (1942) 13.
' C. 400, §2, subsec. (b).
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would serve. Obtaining one of these "licenses," it is now declared,
does not permit one to practice "a profession, business or trade for
which a State qualification license is required." 3 These license taxes
are taxes and the so-called "license" comes nearer being a receipt for
their payment than a license. So long as the law of the state permits
a sale of one of these "personal" businesses or professional practices,
as it certainly now does, and so long as the courts of the state will
protect the buyer in what he has bought, as they certainly now will, 4
it is believed that the distinction for purposes of taxation is not as real
as was supposed and could as well have been omitted. The state might
well be satisfied with one tax for the conduct of a dentist's office at
one place for a year. But whether this general criticism is thought to
be fully warranted or not, it seems a little hard to discern without
revenue department glasses the distinction in intimate personal character between $20 paid a town to sell lightning rods and $100 paid
the state to sell sewing machines. 5* If it is desired to encourage one
business and not the other, that policy would ordinarily be carried out
by lighter or severer rates.
A thoroughgoing revision of the theater and movie license taxes
with elaborate new graduations was passed as this session independent,
apparently, of any recommendation from the Tax Research Department. 6 Graduations in taxation are of many sorts, the best known
and most felt now, of course, being those in income taxation where
the basis is net amount of money received. 7 In the license tax area
the chain store and gasoline pump levies present other illustrations,
wherein the number of outlets constitutes the governing factor.8 Graduations, are classifications of a somewhat systematic character. The
amended movie section contains both new graduations and other classifications of interest. The amount payable is governed by: seating
capacity (new); size of community in which operated and location in
the community with reference to the business center (old, though
modified as to amount); and status as a neighborhood theater, a
theater for colored patrons or a seasonal resort theater. All that the
applicable constitutional provisions require of classifications is that they
be reasonable, not arbitrary, which in taxation seems to mean that the
' C. 400 §2, subsec. (a).
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §2563, par. 5, proviso; Breckenridge,
Restraint of Trade in North Carolina (1929) 7 N. C. L. Rzv. 249, 252.
S*N. C. REvENuE LAW §§120, 125; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§§7880(50) and (56). The opening subsection of §125 seems to provide for a
real license fee, in addition to provision in other subsections for a gross receipts
tax payable to the state and a license tax payable to towns.
'C. 400, §2, subsec. (c).
'N.
C. REv. LAW §310; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(127).
8
N. C. REVENUE LAW §§162, 162 2 ; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§§7880(93) and (93)b.

19431

STATUTORY CHANGES IN N. C. IN 1943

distinctions made must have some reasonable relation to the value of
the subject taxed or to ability to pay.9 A tax based on the number of
persons who passed the movie door would likely be good even if nearby
was an institution for the blind and many who passed by were of that
non-prospective-patron group. 'All the classifications in the present
amendment seem pretty obviously to stand up under such a test unless
it is the one based on race. If a tax were levied per ticket sold and
at a different tax rate for those sold to white and colored patrons regardless of ticket price, the distinction would be one solely .based on
race and obviously bad. The present tax is not so certain. It is, of
course, not levied necessarily on a Negro taxpayer. The theater may
be owned by a white man or a Chinese. ° * So far as it of necessity
touches Negroes it does so indirectly and it is favorable to that minority
group. It reduces slightly the cost of operation and encourages the
business. That may open the educational and recreational advantages':*
to them at a lower figure, or at least, at the regular figure where otherwise they would not be offered. This may be sufficient-a tax scheme
set up to further a proper state policy. -But also on purely tax grounds
the classification may possibly be justified. Statistics show what everyone knows, that by and large colored people are poorer than white
people. 12* While it does not at all follow that dealing with poorer
people yields less profit in many business (e.g., the installment furniture, money lending and cheap housing rackets) it is apparent that
poor people have less to spend on luxuries and there may be reasonable ground for a legislative opinion that tax concessions should be
made to those who offer this quasi-luxury to a poorer class, based
on an assumed level of ability to pay. The legislature does not have
to be right in its assumptions. It only need have some reasonable
ground for making them. In this light the classification is only incidentally one of race. A classification based on annual income of patrons would involve the same element but would be impossible of
application, since no check of incomes could practically be made and
patrons of theaters do not segregate by income anyway. This fact
brings to the fore again the racial character of the tax distinction under
discussion since theater patrons in North Carolina generally must be
o Relation of Holding Companies to Operating Companies in Power and Gas,
H. R. REP. No. 827, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1935) part 2, 122-25, 133, footnote 123.
,0*
Who would be a "colored person" in some parts of the globe.
21* Considering the quality of film and vaudeville frequently offered, some
people including sociologists might be of opinion that no useful policy was served
by the classification-that the influence was more calculated to do harm than
good.
l* MURRAY, THE NEGRO HANDBOOK (1942) 38, reprinting table from Nat.
Resources Board, Consumer Income in the U. S. (Washington, D. C., 1942). If
the classification operated to the disadvantage of the Negro, i.e., was an economic
discrimination against him, there would be little doubt of its invalidity.
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and are segregated by race. The tax thus tends, so far as it has any
tendency in this matter at all, to further the race segregation system.
A tax with the same economic objectives might very well make concessions to theaters in neighborhoods "the other side of the tracks."
It would be surer of federal constitutional support if it did, although
it probably will stand up as it is.
In the, amendments to Section 15013 the state has abandoned the
effort to coerce laundries, by penalty in the form of a heavier gross
receipts tax, to collect a sales tax from their customers by the use of
revenue stamps. All that is now done is to make the laundryman pay
the state the same amount as a gross receipts tax whether or not he
does as he is told and adds it to the customer's bill.
It may be asked what this sales tax is doing in the license tax
schedule anyway. Admittedly it is not a license tax, first, because the
section already contains a license tax on laundries and, second, because
it is neither called that nor is it in nature a license tax, being expressly
one to be collected on each "sale" to the customer. Perhaps some
gentleman after casting a calculating eye on the not-so-trim figures of
his male friends and neighbors in their seersucker suits, thinks there
is a place for another laundry. He might be glad to find all the law
that would pertain to him as a launderer, especially taxes, in one place
in the statutes, Topic: "The Law of Laundries, including therein Wet
Wash, Chinese, Home, Spotless and all others, and the legal rules pertaining to, and the boards administering the legal rules pertaining to,
such enterprises." The tendency in up-to-date law school curriculums
has been in that realistic direction. But in the statutes we have shown
little taste for this type of unification. One must usually, even in 1943,
look for sales taxes (more accurately, purchase taxes) in the Sales
Tax Schedule. If, for example, one sells lightning rods he pays a very
personal 14 license fee and a gross receipts tax and apparently an annual
license tax to towns, all under Section 12515* in Schedule B but the
sales tax is to be found under Schedule E. So long as we have that
arrangement of the statutes, putting nearly all sales taxes in the sales
tax schedule, there appears to be no very good reason for making it
different with laundries, even if the rate as to them is one per cent
and not three. To which it can perhaps be replied that, in its present
lenient form, the tax is' not realistically, or in practical operation, a sales
tax at all but a gross receipts tax.
1
1

C.
See400,
text§2,
to-subsec.
footnote(q).
1, supra.
N. C. CoDE. ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7880(56). Though the sales tax is not
included in §125, that section in having the several fees above mentioned, is another instance of combining diverse taxes contrary to the usual scheme.
1*
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Machinery Act

Last year an inquiry was directed to the Attorney General on behalf of a local taxing official to learn whether real estate owned by
the Defense Plant Corporation was subject to local ad valorem taxation. The Attorney General was forced to reply' that while the Federal
Government had given its consent to taxation of this particular property2 the North Carolina statute expressly excluded such holdings by
the exemption of all realty "indirectly owned by the United States."8
The Department of Tax Research, pointing out that local revenues
suffer from the increasing areas of such non-taxables (though there
are grants in lieu sometimes 4 ), proposed that the exemption of "indirectly" owned United States realty be stricken 5 and this was done.S*
Since the state's power to tax federal property apparently can go no
further than the Federal Government specifically permits, 7* a repeal
of all exemption goes in terms too far. But what we can't tax we
can't tax and it would hardly be necessary to add that we exempt all
federal property which we must exempt. If, however, we did make
power to tax the express measure of our taxing effort in this direction 8
we might find a chance to levy on some directly owned federal real
estate as well in some case where federal permission was likewise
granted.
The only striking feature of this amendment, however, is its retroactive character. Though the act was ratified March 8, it operated to
put such previously exempt property on the books for 1943 as if it had
been listed in regular course and at the January 1 valuation under Section 302 of the Machinery Act. Various kinds of taxes retroactive
within the calendar year have been sustained in the past 9 and since the
repeal of exemptions makes for uniformity there seems little reason
(Sept. 1942) 8 Pop. GOv'T 11.
STAT. 9 (1932), 15 U. S. C. A. §610 (1939); see also, similar, 55 STAT.
365 (1941), 12 U. S. C. A. §1706b (Supp. 1942); 52 STAT. 108 (1938), 15
U. S. C. A. §713 a-5 (Supp. 1942).
'N. C. ConE ANN. (Michie, 1939) §7971(129)(1); MAcH'Y Acr §600(1).
'See, e.g. 56 STAT. 12 (1942), 42 U. S. C. A. §1546 (Supp. 1942); Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Report (May, 1943) 21 TAXES 250, 286.
'REP. DEP'T OF TAX RESEARCH (1942) 34.
'*C. 634, §2. The amendment also removed the exemption of property indirectly owned by state or local governments.
'* City of New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U. S.547, 48 S. Ct. 371, 72
L. Ed. 693 (1928); United States v. Philadelphia, 48 F. Supp. 379 (E. D. Pa.
1942)'; Commodity Credit Corp. v. County of Okla., 36 F. Supp. 694 (W. D.
Okla. 1941); cf. note (1940) 38 McH. L. Rav. 738. It was apparently thought
necessary to save to the state of Michigan the right to tax "persons and corporations, their franchises and property" on lands in Isle Royale National Park.
56 STAT. 133 (1942), 16 U. S. C. A. §408(i) (Supp. 1942).
'As Alabama, 8 ALA. CODEi (1940), Tit. 51, §22, and Georgia, Laws 1939, No.
203, p. 95, have done.
'With 4 CooLEY TAxATiok (4th ed. 1924) §522, cf. note (1939) 16 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 466.
1
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to fear for the constitutionality of this measure even in the unlikely
event of a challenge.
The only other significant amendment to the Machinery Act suspends Section 1604-the tax on cars of freight lines-in favor of the
newly enacted gross receipts provision (Section 852) of the Revenue
Act dealing with those businesses, which is referred to under that head
herein. Section 1604 will return to operation, however, if the new
tax is invalidated on test.
WAR-EMERGENCY POWERS
C. 706 The North CarolinaEmergency War Powers Act
This statute has its origin in the work of the Council of State
Governments, whose drafting committee has been at work since 1941
on model proposals for state war legislation. During 1941, the council
made available drafts of legislation for the establishment of state councils of defense, for mobilization of state guards, for the control of
explosives and for the prevention of sabotage. Many states adopted
one or more of these proposals. In 1942, this list was increased by
measures designed to promote the civilan defense program, dealing with
such matters as air raid precautions, control of military traffic, fire
defense, and other "home front" programs. Since forty-four state legislatures were to meet in 1943, the Council of State Governments developed a comprehensive program of state war legislation for submission
to the state legislatures, including an overall "State Emergency War
Powers Act," and specific legislation dealing with such subjects as
"emergency statutory suspension," "emergency transportation," "explosives," "emergency fiscal measures," "establishment of child care
centers," "war housing," etc. About fifteen war emergency measures
were drafted for the purpose of furthering the states' war efforts. 1
All of the states have adopted one or more of these proposed statutes
either as originally drafted or after amendments to meet local conditions. New York has an elaborate "War Emergency Act," adopted
first in 1942 and amended in 1943.2* This act is published in a separate pamphlet, because it is not enacted as a Consolidated Law and expires on July 1, 1944. It sets up a state war council and local war councils with power to deal with all manner of war emergencies. Compared
with this comprehensive legislation, Virginia and Washington, for example, have adopted specific statutes covering such topics as blackouts
War Legislation Submitted to States (1942) 15 STATE Gov'T. 238.
2
* McKIxxEy's CONS. LAws N. Y. N. Y. WAR EMERGENCY AcT, 1943. In
People v. Bishop, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 838 (Magistrate's Court, City of New York,
1942) defendant was convicted of violation of blackout regulations under the
War Emergency Act. Constitutionality was assumed.
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and air raid protection,3 transportation of troops and military supplies, 4
regulation of traffic on highways, 5 mobilization of state and local officials and employees,6 etc. In Washington, a war council composed
of the Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Insurance Commissioner is
set up with power to make necessary rules and regulations to carry
out the statutes; in Virginia, such authority is vested in the Governor
alone.
The North Carolina Emergency War Power Act7 is a comprehensive
statute modeled on the proposals of the Council of State Governments
for emergency legislation to enable a state government to meet the problems arising out of the war. An excellent description of the act may
be found in Popular Government for June, 1943, where it is pointed
out that the North Carolina statute is of especial interest in the matter
of conferring such large powers upon the Governor, because North
Carolina is the only state in the union which does not trust its Governor with the veto power.
A short summary of the North Carolina Emergency War Powers
Act follows in order to indicate the tremendous scope of executive
authority granted therein.
Upon his own initiative or on the request or recommendation of
proper federal authorities, the Governor, when in his judgment such
action is in the public interest, may:
(a) formulate and execute plans for (1) the mobilization, conservation and distribution of all necessaries of life and of land, labor,
materials, industries and resources of the state needed in prosecuting
the war; (2) the organization and coordination of civilian defense in
conformity with the federal program.
(b) order and carry out blackouts and other precautionary measures and suppress activities which may aid the enemy.
(c) mobilize and direct activities of police, fire-fighting, public
utilities, medical and other services of the state, political subdivisions
or of private agencies for the mutual aid of the people of the state in
any emergency.
(d) regulate traffic, the congregating of people in public places,
lights and noises of all kinds and operation of utility and transportation
services.
(e) accept grants, or loans of funds or equipment from the federal
government or any other source for war or defense purposes.
(f) lend or lease state property to the armed forces of the United
States.
:Va. Acts of Assembly 1942, c. 249; Wash. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 241.
'Wash. Sess. Laws 1943, c. 242.
' Va. Acts of Assembly 1942, c. 248; Wash. 'Sess. Laws 1943, c. 243.
*Va. Acts of Assembly 1942, c. 10, 250.

' N. C. Pub. L. 1943, c. 706.
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(g) transfer state personnel temporarily, for employment by the
armed forces.
(h) suspend or modify certain laws when the General Assembly
is not in session, the subjects being: (1) the use of state roads (when
approved by the State Highway and Public Works Commission and
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles); (2) public health (when approved by the State Board of Health); (3) labor and industry (when
certified by the Commissioner of Labor as being necessary in the interest of national safety and the furtherance of the war program) ; (4)
the mobilization of the state militia, and (5) the manufacture, sale,
use, etc. of fireworks, explosives and firearms.
(i) cooperate with federal and state agencies of civilian defense.
(j) aid in the administration and enforcement of rationing, freezing, price-fixing and other similar programs of the federal government.
(k) formulate and execute plans to provide for the operation of
aircraft warning services and the organization and training of civilian
-defense workers.
This extensive enumeration of activities brought within the scope
of the Governor's authority covers practically all civilian phases of the
war effort. In addition to his constitutional position as commander-inchief of the state militia,8 the Governor is, under this statute, the head
of all civilian defense. To carry out the authority conferred by the
statute, the Governor may, with the approval of the Council of State,
adopt, promulgate and enforce such orders, rules and regulations as
may be necessary. He may hold and conduct hearings, issue subpoenas,
take testimony, etc. in connection with any investigation made by him
under the authority of the act. Such rules and regulations shall have
the full force and effect of law and are to become effective from the
date of filing in the office of the Secretary of State. Violations are
punishable as misdemeanors. The statute is to continue in effect while
the existing state of war continues or for six months thereafter or until
the convening of the next General Assembly in January, 1945.
The general validity of such emergency legislation might be questioned. Is it proper exercise of the state's police power, which Mr.
Chief Justice Taney said was "nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions?"O Do the usual constitutional limitations of due process of law
or delegation of legislative power apply? Is the state's police power
during the emergency of war comparable to the war power of the federal government?
For the purpose of comparison, it might be well to consider briefly
8
N. C. CoNsT. Art. III, §8.
'License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583, 12 L. ed. 256, 291 (U. S. 1847).
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and in a general way the limitations upon the war powers of the United
States. Shall we say in the language of Ex parte Milligan, "The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit
of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any
of the great exigencies of government." 1 0 Or as the Honorable Charles
Evans Hughes said in an address in the early days of World War I,
"While we are at war we are not in revolution. We are making war
as a Nation organized under the Constitution, from which the estabor in
lished national authorities derive all their power either in war
'
peace. The Constitution is as effective today as it ever was. ll*
Or, on the other hand, shall we say about our Constitution what
an English judge said about the English Constitution, "a war could
not be carried on according to the principles of Magna Charta."'12 And
shall we agree with Professor Edward S. Corwin, who concludes that
the United States Constitution is not needed as a source of national
power for war purposes, as such powers are "necessary concomitants
of nationality."13

These commentaries on the war powers of the United States might
be compared with the following summary of the situation in England
under the Emergency Powers (Defense) Act of 1940:
"The question posed above as to whether or not the powers granted
by the emergency legislation are so wide that they are intrinsically
capable of abuse, must clearly be answered in the affirmative. Though
apparently it is still not possible for taxation to be imposed without
consent of Parliament, nor for the ownership of land to be acquired
without express statutory authority, and though no civilian may be
tried by court martial, there is little else which might not be done by
for the
executive order if, it were considered necessary or expedient
defense of the realin or the maintenance of public order."' 4
The scope of the war powers of the United States and England,
however, are introduced only for purposes of comparison. Our concern is with the power of the State of North Carolina to enact the
North Carolina Emergency War Powers Act. Is this statute a valid
exercise of the State's police power?
parte Milligan, 4 Wall, 2, 120, 18 L. ed. 281, 295 (U. S. 1866).
Quoted in Corwin, The War and the Constitution. (1943) 37 Am. PoL. Sci.
Rv. 18, 24. Mr. Corwin doubts if Mr. Hughes would venture the same statement
today.
(C. A. 1918).
12 Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, 35 T. L. R. 47
"1Corwin, The War atd the Constitution (1943) 37 Am. Poi. Sci. REV. 18,
quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 318, 57 S.
Ct. 1216, 221, 81 L. ed. 255, 261 (1936).
1 Jennings, Tire Rule of Law in Total War (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 365, 380.
10 Ex
12*
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An answer to this question may be found in tle Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case. 5 where the power of a state to deal with an
economic emergency "by the use of reasonable means to safeguard
the economic structure upon which the good of all depends" was upheld, although the obligation of mortgage contracts was definitely
impaired. The Court took the view that contracts are made subject
to the exercise of the police power of the state when otherwise justified,
as by the existence of an emergency, as long as the legislative provisions
are reasonable. This may be a variation of the argument that every
government possesses the inherent right of self-preservation. "While
the courts hold that the Constitution is not suspended or set aside by
war or national emergency, it is thought that the Constitution and all
other laws must be read in the light of and to some extent subject to,
the primal and fundamental concept of the necessity for self-preservation."' 6
"Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase
granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon
power granted or reserved.... While emergency does not create power,
emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power ...
Thus the war power of the federal government is not created by the
emergency of war, but it is a power given to meet that emergency.
It is a power to wage war successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme co-operative effort
to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties.' 17
If the police power of a state may be exercised to meet the emergency of an economic depression, it may also be put forth to meet the
demands created by the emergency of war, as long as the means adopted
are reasonably calculated to accomplish the desired objectives. Such
comprehensive emergency legislation as the statute in question should
be constitutional. The only case which has come to our attention involving similar legislation is from New Jersey, where Judge Van Riper
the Essex County Court of Common Pleas' 8 upheld the constitutionality of the New Jersey Emergency Defense Act.' 9
Assuming the power of a state to enact such comprqhensive emergency legislation, there remains the problem of the validity of the particular North Carolina statute, when detailed orders, rules or regulations under the act are applied to persons or property. The reason" Home Building and Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S.Ct. 231,
78 L.
ed. 413 (1934), commented upon in note (1934) 12 N. C. L. REV. 363.
1
Cox, J. in Southport Petroleum Co. v. Ickes, 1 U. S. WEEKLY L. J. 473
(Sup.
Ct. D. C. 1933).
17
Home Building and Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426, 54 S. Ct.
231,1 8240,
78 L. ed. 413, STATE
(1934).
Referred to in 16 422
GOV'T. 200 (Sept. 1943).
1
N. J. Laws 1942, c. 251; N. J.STAT. AN. App. A :9-33 to 9-57 (Supp. 1943).
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ableness of any particular application of legislation is always open to
attack in the courts. 20 The principal bases of attack on the North
Carolina Emergency War Powers Act would be: (1) the rule making
power conferred upon the Governor is an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power and (2) the order, rule or regulation in question
is unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore a person is deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.
In the New Jersey case above referred to, the attack was on the
first of these grounds. The court held that both the statute and the
regulations promulgated by the Governor are valid, saying, "It is clear
that the legislature defined a policy .

.

. and that they did not delegate

to the Governor legislative authority, but rather having made him commander-in-chief of civilian activities, in addition to military activities
of the state, which power he already possesses by virtue of his office,
they merely placed in his hands the duty and responsibility of administering that policy." 2 1
The general doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power is provided in the North Carolina Constitution 22* and accepted by the North
Carolina Supreme Court. In Provision Co. v. Daves,2 3 Stacy, C. J.
quoted from the U. S. Supreme Court as follows:
"'It must be admitted that it is difficult to define the line which
separates legislative power to make laws, from administrative authority
to make regulations. .

.

. The line has not been exactly drawn which

separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated
by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general
provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under
such general provisions to fill up the details.'"
The famous Schechter case, 24 which sounded the death knell of
N. R. A., was decided on the ground of unlawful delegation of legislative power. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said, "Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed or advisable
for the rehabilitation and expansion of trade or industry." 2 5 Mr. Jus-

tice Cardozo, concurring, said, "The delegated power of legislation
which has found expression in this code is not canalized within banks
20
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71
L. ed.
303 (1926).
21 (1943)
16 STATE Gov'T. 200.
21* N. C. CosT. Art. I, §--"The legislative, executive and supreme judicial
power of the government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
other:'
Art. II, §1--"The legislative authority shall be vested in two distinct branches,
both dependent on the people, to wit: a Senate and a House of Representatives."
23 190 N. C. 7. 11-12, 128 S. E. 593. 595 (1925).
"' Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 55 S. Ct. 837, 79
L. ed. 1570 (1935).
2 2295 U. S. at 537, 538, 55 S. Ct. at 846, 79 L. ed. at 1584.
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that keep it from overflowing. It is unconfined and vagrant .... Here
in effect is a roving commission to inquire info evils and upon discovery
26
correct them."
Thus the unconstitutionality of the N. R. A., is due to two factors
relating to delegation of legislative power. In the first place, the legislature must not turn over its essential function 'of policy-determination
to the executive, and, in the second place, the scope of the delegated
authority must be limited. Unlimited scope for executive action, with
no definite legislative standards for guidance, and in an area where
governmental policy is involved, made for the unconstitutionality of
N. R. A.
Are the standards set up by C. 706 sufficiently definite to meet the
constitutional tests?27* Under Section 2, the Governor may issue orders, make rules and regulations, formulate and execute plans for a
variety of items, mentioned above, all of which are general in character,
"whenever in his judgment any such action is in the public interest
and is necessary for the protection of the lives or property of the people of the State, or for the defense and security of the State or nation,
or for the proper conduct of the war and the successful prosecution
thereof. . . ." Or let us examine Subsection (a) of Section 2, where
the subject matter is "(1) the inventory, mobilization, conservation,
distribution or use of food, fuel, clothing .andother necessaries of life
and health, and olf land, labor, materials, industries, facilities and other
resources of the State necessary or useful in the prosecution of the
war. . . ." Or examine Subsection (h) where the Governor may "at
any time when the General Assembly is not in session, suspend, or
modify, in whole or in part, generally or in its application to certain
classes of persons, firms, corporation or circumstances, any law, rule
or regulation with reference to subjects hereinafter enumerated, when
he shall find . . . that the operation, enforcement or application of such
law, or any part thereof, materially hinders, impedes, delays or interferes with the proper conduct of the war..... "
To be more specific, on August 3, 1943, a number of " North Carolina Emergency War Powers Proclamations" were filed in the Secretary of State's office. Two of these proclamations modify the labor
laws of the state. Proclamation No. 1 permits night work and longer
hours for women, thus suspending anci modlitying existing statutes
designed for the protection of women. 2 8 Proclamation No. 3 changes
28295 U. S. at 551, 55 S. Ct. at 852, 79 L. ed. at 1591.
2'*

See State v. Tenant, 110 N. C. 609, 14 S.E. 387 (1892), the leading North

Carolina decision which states the requirement of adequate legislative standards
in order to avoid arbitrary executive action.
2 N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 317, §2, c. 409, §3; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§§5038(2), 6564(3).
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the North Carolina child labor laws 29 by permitting more night work
and longer hours for minors, both male and female.
The current manpower shortage is proclaimed as the justification
for these changes. The existing labor laws for women and children
are found to hinder materially the proper conduct of the war. One
might question whether these changes are really in the public interest
or will promote the proper conduct of the war. But whatever view is
taken of the merits of such modifications of the labor laws designed
by the General Assembly to promote the public interest by protecting
women and children, it is clear that the changes constitute law-making
and involve large issues of policy-determination. The legislative standards, such as "proper conduct of the war," when applied to such a
wide range of activities, are so general that almost anything may be
justified under them.3O* The legislative standards found in the National Industrial Recovery Act to be insufficient, appear to be at least
as definite as those set forth in C. 706. Unless our courts conclude
that the emergency of war waives the constitutional limitations implicit in non-delegability of legislative authority, there must be doubts
concerning the validity of the executive action in question.
A second basis for attack on the North Carolina Emergency War
Powers Act might be that the order, rule or regulation in question is
unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore a deprivation of life, liberty
or property without the due process of law. 3 ' Emergency War Powers
Proclamation No. 4 may be objected to on this ground, in addition to
the constitutional objection of delegation of legislative power. Proclamation No. 4 provides for labor mobilization. Local labor mobilization
boards are set up in each county, whose duty it is to make plans for
'the inventory, mobilization, conservation, distribution and use of labor
in such county necessary or useful in the prosecution of the war." All
male persons between 18 and 55 who are not gainfully employed or in
the armed forces and who are physically able to work are to be listed
and reported to the local U. S. Employment Service by local boards,
with notice to the individual by mail. The county committee or any
authorized representative may subpoena any person who appears to
be between 18 and 55 years old and unemployed and require answers
under oath as to age, address, and employment status. Failure or re20 N. C. Pub. L. 1937, c. 317, §§2, 8, c. 409, §3; N. C. CoDn
1939) §§5038(2), 5039(8), 6564(3).

ANN. (Michie,

30* The United States Supreme Court has recently upheld the standard of
"public interest, convenience or necessity" provided by the Communications Act
for licensing radio broadcasting stations. While the standard is general, the area
of activity is strictly limited. National Broadcasting Co. v. U. S., 318 U. S.,
63 S. Ct. 997, 87 L. ed. 933 (1943).
"xU. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, §1; N. C. CoxsT. Art. I, §17.
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fusal to answer such questions, whether under oath or otherwise, is
made unlawful.
It might be pointed out that the statute gives the subpoena power
to the Governor. In Cudalty Packing Co. v. Holland,8 2 the United
States Supreme Court held that the power to issue subpoenas could
not be delegated unless authority for such delegation could clearly be
inferred from the statutory provisions. C. 706 Section 2(m) gives the
subpoena power to the Governor "in connection with any investigation
made by him under the authority of this act." The sub-delegation to
county committees and the further delegation by county committees to
authorized agents, provided in Proclamation No. 4, would seem to extend the subpoena power far beyond the authority conferred by the
statute upon the Governor.
The Proclamation provides that it is the duty of any unemployed
person, who is offered a job through the United States Employment
Service, which by reason of his physical condition and experience, he
is reasonably able to perform, "to accept and properly apply himself"
within 24 hours after notice of the offer. Wilful refusal to accept such
employment or to engage in some other gainful employment, without
just cause and excuse, shall be a violation of the Proclamation and be
punishable for a misdemeanor.
This proclamation was designed to "put teeth" into the Governor's
earlier "work or fight" proclamation. Is it a valid exercise of the state's
police power? Or, what amounts to the same thing, does it violate due
process? In protecting the rights of individuals against public regulation, the ourts have developed a broad concept of "liberty" under
the Fourteenth Amendment. It includes freedom from physical restraint and the right to the free use of one's property and to enter into
contractual relations. It is well understood that the employment contract may be regulated in many ways under the police power. Reference to labor legislation regulating hours of work, wages and conditions
of employment, shows the scope of such regulation. But Proclamation
IV goes much further. It amounts to compulsory service under prescribed limitations. The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 33 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude. If the
work or fight order does not involve involuntary servitude, because
the individual is given some choice, is it a deprivation of liberty without -due process of law?33* As a limitation on the police power, this
-- 315 U. S. 357, 62 S. Ct. 651, 86 L. ed. 895 (1942).
"3*In Hawaii v. Anduha, 48 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) an anti-loafing
statute was held unconstitutional on the ground that it infringes the right of the
citizen to do what he will so long as his conduct is not inimicable to 'himself or
to the public.
The ordinary vagrancy statutes require proof of an unreasonable refusal to
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means that the police power purpose must be reasonable and the means
to accomplish that purpose must also be reasonable.
The purpose of the Labor Mobilization Proclamation is to meet the
manpower shortage so that industry and- agriculture in the state may
produce at fullest capacity and thus promote the war effort. Surely,
this is a worthy police power objective. There remains, therefore, only
the question of the reasonableness of the means adopted to accomplish
this worthy objective. From the procedural viewpoint, there would
seem to be adequate protection for the individual. There are provisions
for notice and opportunity to be heard. There are reasonable exceptions. The individual may accept the offered job or he may engage in
"some other gainful employment" of his own choosing. And if any
person is prosecuted under this proclamation for wilfully refusing "to
accept such employment or engage in some other gainful employment,
without just cause or excuse," he has his day in court where he may
challenge the administrative order as applied to his case.
The statute provides not only for the conscription of labor where
necessary or useful in the prosecution of the war, but it also includes
similar conscription of "land, materials, industries, facilities and other
resources of the state." Here is an unlimited area for executive action,
apparently too broad and unconfined under the tests of delegability of
legislative power laid down by the courts. Here is a wide open loor
for arbitrary action, if the executive were so disposed. What may be
attempted under this authority in conscripting property and labQr will
34
be of the greatest interest to the citizens of this state. *
WILLS
C. S. 4151 which made provision for the probate of wills of soldiers
and sailors during World War I expired by its own limitation on
April 6, 1922. C. 218 reenacts this statute but places no time limit
upon its operation. The new act provides for the admission to probate
of the wills of members of the merchant marine, as well as those of
sailors and soldiers. It provides that the will of such person may be
admitted to probate, if executed while the testator is in active service,
upon the oath of at least three creditable witnesses that the signature
to the will is in the handwriting of the person whose will it purports
work on the part of a defendant who is without visible means of support. Such
statutes are generally upheld because their purpose is to prevent persons from
becoming public charges. Proclamation No. 4 applies to all who are capable of
working, regardless of financial position.
"*The following North Carolina Emergency War Powers Proclamations
have been issued:
No.1 Labor Laws
No. 5 Motor Vehicle Laws
No. 2 Motor Vehicle Laws
No. 6 Dim Out Regulations
No. 3 Labor Laws
No. 7 Air Raid and Black-out Regulations,
No. 4 Labor Mobilization
No. 8 Transportation of Petroleum Products
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to be. Such probate is allowed if there were no subscribing witnesses
to the will or if the subscribing witnesses or either of them is out of the
state at the time the will is offered for probate. A will so proved
is effective to dispose of either real or personal property or both.
Pending litigation, however, is not affected by the new law.
C. 218 simply provides a more convenient method for the probate
of wills, not holographic in their nature, executed by active members
of the armed forces. •The convenience lies in the fact that such a will
does not have to have executing witnesses or if there are such and they
are out of the state at time of probate they do not have to be used. The
new law is not exclusive but is in addition to methods of probate already provided for by statute. Sed quaere whether a nuncupative or
oral will made by a soldier or sailor while dying on the field of battle
could be effectively probated under the provisions of C. S.4144(3).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
*Section 11 of the Act' has always been a source of difficulty. The
reason is not far to seek for the section is concerned with matters of
policy on which there have always been many and conflicting views,
among others, what to do with a worker's common law right of recovery
against a third party who injured him. Statutes elsewhere go all the
way from transferring this right to the employer or insurer or insurance fund, which pays compensation, to denying the existence of any
such right as against third parties who are themselves in the compensation scheme, i.e., confining workers to their compensation whenever the
injury is by a person working for an employer who is subject to the
compensation law.2 Our act as it had been amended before the current sessions* apparently had for a general policy the encouraging of
employees to assert compensation claims first and early and to let
possible common law actions wait.4 More specifically, the act seemed
to intend that compensation claims should be determined and the employer (or insurer) should then be7 assured of reimbursement from any
common law recovery to which the employee was entitled by giving the
employer the exclusive right to assert such claim for a period of six
months. The section as interpreted, however, did not prevent the
employee from getting his common law action under way and collecting
both a judgment and compensation without the employer knowing of
the suit at common law.5 The present amendment in specific words
N. C. Pub. L. 1929, c. 120, §11, now §97-10 of the new General Statutes.
'See many types of statutes in DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMP NSATION (1936)

605.
3*N. C. Pub. L. 1933, c. 449. Originally it provided an election of remedies.
' N. C. W. C. A. AiN. (1935) §24 and annotations.
'See Whitehead & Anderson v. Branch, 220 N. C. 504, 17 S. E. (2d) 637
(1941) and citations.
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gives the employer (or insurer) "the exclusive right to commence an
action" after either an award or the admission of compensation liability.6
Whether an action already started by the employee would abate
on the commission's awarding of compensation (it certainly would not
automatically) or whether the employer could then join as party plaintiff and take charge of the suit, the statute does not say. It should
have gone farther and dealt with these and other specific and highly
practical problems in detail. The difficulties are considerable but statutes in other states have made a better start toward a solution.7*
C. 622 makes another change in Section 11, this one in relation to
attorney's fees in suits against third parties. Heretofore these fees,
when approved by the Industrial Commission,s* were first paid out
of the recovery like one of the costs; the employer (or insurer) was
then reimbursed for the compensation paid or due to be paid and the
balance, if any, went to the employee. The present amendment obviously
intends to increase the employee's chance of getting something out of
the third party action by making the employer bear a pro rata share of
the attorney's fee, though it is not worded very perfectly to accomplish
that end.9 * The situations can best be described by illustration. First
before the 1943 amendment: S suffers compensable injury at the hands
of T, a third party. He gets an award of $5,000, which is paid or in
process of payment by M, his employer, and thereafter, in a suit against
T recovers a judgment of $7,500. Ignoring other costs, we deduct the
very modest 33 1/3% attorney's fee (others take 50%, you know!)
amounting to $2,500. The employer (or insurer) pockets the $5,000
balance and the employee gets nothing. This is not as wicked as might
first appear. S has his $5,000 compensation and that is all he would
have gotten net at common law in a case like this. M, who was not
negligent, is made whole before S is entitled to anything. Under the
obvious intendment of the now amended section, however, the $7,500
would be tentatively alloted $5,000 to M and $2,500 to S and the
6 C. 622.
'* See references in note (1940) 7 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 569, which discusses
a Georgia Appeals case wherein the negligent third party was forced to pay
twice.
'*Evidently the Conunission's power is not to fix the fee but to say what
amount may be deducted as a reasonable fee before paying the excess to the
employee. That power should be equally effective in checking an employer's
liberality toward an attorney at the employee's expense and is obviously analogous
to public utility commission and tax authority' control over amounts allowed as
expenses for payments to holding companies and officers.
o*Since the old language is left in about deducting the attorney's-fee before
the employee gets anything, the amended section seems literally to make the
employee chargeable with a pro rata part of the attorney's fee from the amount
left over for him after the entire attorney's fee has been taken into account-a
thing certainly not intended.
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$2,500 fee would then be pro rated between them so M would pay twothirds of it out of his share and get net $3,333, while S would pay onethird and get $1,667 as against nothing under the old law. There is
something delusively equitable-sounding in a provision that employer
and employee each bear his pro rata share of the attorney's fees but
it is believed that the amendment is unsound in theory. There is no
reason why the employee should make a profit at the expense of the
compensation fundlo* so long as the statute contemplates that the
fund shall be reimbursed from any common law recovery against a
negligent third party. If, on the other hand, we are giving up the
idea of reimbursing the fund before the employee gets a hand on
the recovery we might more logically give him the full recovery free
from any claim of the fund.
If it were not for the power vested in the commission to limit
the amount of attorney's fees deductible before payment to the employee, the present amendment might be justified as a protection of the
employee against the risk of collusion between employer or carrier and
the attorney at the employee's expense. Perhaps some will think the act
to be needed. for that purpose anyway on the theory that the employer's
self interest will be a more effective regulator than the supervision of a
disinterested public body. The cost of workmen's compensation will
of necessity be increased some by this innovation but it is understood
recoveries against third parties represent so small a figure relatively
that no change of rates has been made or will be necessary on this
account. At any rate the association of insurance carriers, who will for
the most part take the burden, offered no objection to the bill when it
was introduced, though the officers of that body were advised of the
proposal."
Compensation benefits are increased in two ways by C. 502. (1) The
payments for most of the specific injuries listed in Section 31 are increased by lengthening the period over which payments are to be
made. (2) The maximum weekly payment in cases of partial or
total incapacity for work and in cases of death 12 is raised from eighteen
to twenty-one dollars. Since, however, the over-all maximum of
$6,000 was left unchanged, this legislation results in an economic levelling off in payments, that is, a boost of the lower paid people and payments for specific injuries toward the unchanged $6,000 maximum but
'**The expression "fund" is here used loosely to included either an actual

state fund or the employer or insurer since in any case the costs of maintaining
workmen's compensation are finally a charge on industry.
'-Letter from Mr. J. Dewey Dorsett, Ass't Gen. Mgr., Ass'n of Casualty &
Surety Executives, Aug. 3, 1943.
" N. C. Pub. L. 1929, c. 120, §§29, 30, 38; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1939)
§§8081(kk), (11), (tt).
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no boost for death payments and the higher paid people who are there
already. So far as it had its stimulus in a desire to provide for the
increased cost of living it is open to the criticism that it does not go
far enough and that some of the increases in specific benefits were
needed less thari an increase in the $6,000. No one doubts, of course,
that in this day of high industrial pay and black markets a human thumb
is worth more than in 1933 just as a shoulder of mutton is worth more,
but if a thumb is worth more so is a man and, if payments for a lost
thumb go up, it looks as if the maximum payments for a lost man
should also. That argument is reinforced by a further consideration
peculiar to the present labor market. The demand for workers being
what it is, he with the lost thumb does have an opportunity today to
keep his standard of living by going back to work at just as good
wages as before, while he who is totally incapacitated with his $6,000
does not.ls* The lower paid group who are incapacitated move forward, however, toward the $6,000 maximum and their plight was no
doubt thought the most serious. Victims of days gone by get no relief,
of course, and there is accordingly something to be said for adopting at
another session payments varying with the cost of living, the business
index or the prevailing wage scale.
Amendments to Section 31 included other matters also. The commission's view that the specific compensation for a designated injury
covered all the loss the worker could claim for that injury had been
recently overturned by the supreme court.' 4 Thus, as held by the court,
if a man lost a thumb, he got the specific payment for not having a
thumb to use and the commission should also consider what, if any,
serious damage to his personal appearance resulted. A bad looking operative scar, under this rule, ought to bring added money. The amendment restores the commission's doctrine.' 5 There is one exception,
that of an empty eye socket,1 6 which certainly presents a specially appealing case.
Blindness in another respect comes in for treatment in C. 502.
Under the original language of Section 31 the supreme court had held
17
that total blindness meant just that. Only "the blackness of darkness"'
23* Of course, $6,000 was never enough to compensate a young, healthy worker
for total disability or his dependents for his death. To the extent that he or they
were left dependent on relatives the situation may now be partly met by the
relatives' presumably increased wages. And if these prices are temporary, he may
be back to his normal, though insufficient, purchasing power before his payments
cease. But the raises granted others will still continue, for these amendments
were not designated as emergency legislation. Loss *of toes and deafness came
in for no raise this time, however. C. 502, §2, subsecs. (j), (s).
Stanley v. Hyman-Michaels Co., 222 N. C. 257, 22 S. E. (2d) 570 (1942).
i C. 502, §2, first par. and subsec. (w).
C. 502, §2, subsec. (v).
St. Jude, 1"3.

386

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.21

would satisfy the statute and "industrial blindness," where that included, e.g., the ability to distinguish light from darkness, must be
rated for compensation on a mathematical percentage basis. 18 By
contrast eighty-five percent loss of vision is now made total loss for purposes of compensation. 19
" Logan v. Johnson, 218 N. C. 200, 10 S. E. (2d) 653 (1940).
C. 502, §, subsec. (t).

